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AGENCIES INTERPRETING COURTS INTERPRETING
STATUTES: THE DEFERENCE CONUNDRUM OF A DIVIDED
SUPREME COURT
Robin Kundis Craig*
ABSTRACT
Plurality decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court demand interpretation,
especially because they tend to occur when the Court faces important but
divisive legal issues. Most courts, agencies, and scholars have assumed that
federal agencies are in no better position to interpret plurality decisions than
the lower federal courts when confronted with a potentially precedential
Supreme Court plurality decision—the agency must construe the Justices’
various opinions in search of a controlling rationale. In so doing, however, the
agency eschews any claim to Chevron deference because it is no longer
implementing a statute pursuant to congressionally delegated authority.
Instead, it is merely an agency interpreting a court.
This Article argues that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,
federal agencies have another option when dealing with a Supreme Court
plurality decision regarding either a statute that the agency implements or the
agency’s prior interpretation of that statute. In the right circumstances, these
post-plurality agencies can invoke their original congressionally delegated
authority to implement the statute and issue new regulations that should be
entitled to Chevron deference. Post-plurality agencies thus face a deference
conundrum: they can defer to a fractured Supreme Court decision at the
expense of their own claims to interpretive authority, or they can—admittedly
with some risk in the next round of judicial review—reclaim interpretive
deference for themselves.
In assessing the deference conundrum, the exact character of the plurality
decision is important. This Article includes a typology of Supreme Court
plurality decisions involving agency-mediated statutes. When the
* Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida. My
thanks to Dave Markell, Jim Rossi, J.B. Ruhl, Mark Seidenfeld, and Uma Outka for their comments on the
draft of this Article. Nevertheless, I remain solely responsible for its content.
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Chevron/Brand X framework applies, however, agencies have the opportunity,
and arguably the duty, to eliminate the confusion and inconsistency that
plurality decisions promote by issuing clarifying and nationally uniform rules.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1984, when the Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,1 it solidified a basic principle of federal
administrative law: federal agencies are generally entitled to deference from
the federal courts when those agencies interpret statutes that they implement,
unless Congress has clearly already resolved the interpretive issue at hand.2
While the Court has since modified the rules regarding the circumstances
under which agencies are entitled to Chevron deference,3 creating what many
commentators have denominated “a confusing muddle” of deference tests,4 it
has never repudiated the core Chevron principle of interpretive deference.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, explicitly subordinated its
own interpretive authority to that of agencies.5 More generally, in 2005 it
announced in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services (Brand X) that the rationale of Chevron deference could allow an
agency’s interpretation of a statute to supersede a prior and contradictory
interpretation by a federal court.6
Despite the Court’s privileging of agency interpretations, judicial review
remains an important component of the deference framework,7 just as it is of

1

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842–44.
3 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“We hold that administrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”); Christensen v.
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000) (declining to accord Chevron deference to opinion letters issued
regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006))).
4 Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of
Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 262 (2008); accord Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779,
809–35 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 556, 606 (2009); Evan J.
Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1302, 1314–15 (2008); Claire R. Kelly, The Brand X
Liberation: Doing Away with Chevron’s Second Step as Well as Other Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 151, 158, 161 (2010); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REV. 597, 605–09 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 193–94, 202
(2006).
5 See discussion infra Part I.C.3.
6 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
7 See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary
Debate, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 385, 397–402; Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some
Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 442–43 (1989).
2
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administrative law more generally.8 Judicial review of federal agencies’
statutory interpretations serves several purposes: it ensures that agencies do not
act ultra vires or improperly expand the scope of their statutory authorities;9 it
protects the public’s right of participation in agency decision making;10 it
assesses the agency’s interpretations for basic rationality;11 it encourages the
agency to take more care in resolving interpretive issues;12 and most
importantly for this Article, it ensures that both the agency and regulated
entities receive clear guidance regarding what the law requires and allows.
In the context of federal agencies, such clarity promotes other values as
well. For example, there is widespread acceptance, as a normative matter, that
federal law should apply uniformly throughout the nation. Frank Easterbrook
has noted that delegation to an agency “ensures that a single interpretation
prevails” and “permits a nationally uniform rule without the need for the
Supreme Court to settle the meaning of every law or regulation”13—even if the
Court could undertake such a monumental task, which it cannot.14 Similarly,

8 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Government
Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 499
(2006); David S. Rubenstein, “Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2169 (2010); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of
Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997).
9 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (2006) (allowing courts to overturn federal agency actions that are
unconstitutional); id. § 706(2)(C) (allowing courts to overturn federal agency actions that are “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”); Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern
Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 646, 666–68 (1988);
Sargentich, supra note 8, at 605–06.
10 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring federal agencies to provide a public comment period during informal
rulemaking); id. § 554(c) (requiring that interested parties be allowed to participate in federal agency
hearings); id. § 706(2)(D) (allowing courts to overturn federal agency actions that do not follow proper
procedures).
11 See id. § 706(2)(A) (creating the federal “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review); id. § 706(2)(E)
(creating the “substantial evidence” standard of review for formal agency proceedings); Bressman, supra note
8, at 474; Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1127, 1134 (2010); Sargentich, supra note 8, at 605–06.
12 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing
Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 128–30 (1994); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s
Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 303 (2011).
13 Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004);
accord William Wade Buzbee, Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
582, 602 (1985) (noting that “administrative agencies have a national jurisdiction” and assuming that “uniform
administration by the agency” is a worthy goal).
14 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1100, 1117–26 (1987)
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commentators or legislators seeking consistent resolutions to nationwide
problems often seek to establish a regulatory program within a federal
agency.15 At the individual level, the federal courts insist that federal agencies
treat similarly situated regulated entities throughout the nation consistently in
adjudications.16 Thus, judicial review promotes uniform implementation of
regulatory law nationwide by giving clear guidance regarding the legitimacy of
the agency’s implementation of that law.
Legal clarity, certainty, and uniformity are recognized rule-of-law values,17
particularly when the law seeks to regulate private conduct.18 Judicial review
by the Supreme Court promotes these rule-of-law values both by resolving
(noting that, given the Court’s limited docket, Chevron deference represents a concession that statutes are not
precise).
15 See, e.g., Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the States in
Labor-Management Relations Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 120 (2009) (“[L]abor law
preemption doctrine sprang from the New Dealers’ faith in a federal administrative agency’s ability to
enunciate and promulgate a uniform and consistent national labor relations policy.”); Joseph A. Peters, The
Meaningful Vote Commission: Restraining Gerrymanders with a Federal Agency, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1051, 1068 (2010) (“A federal agency would provide a national, consistent system for limiting
gerrymandering.”); Bradley T. Tennis, Note, Uniform Ethical Regulation of Federal Prosecutors, 120 YALE
L.J. 144, 178 (2010) (“A uniform national system of regulation for federal prosecutors can be created only by a
federal agency . . . .”).
16 See, e.g., P.I.A. Mich. City Inc. v. Thompson, 292 F.3d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Indep. Petrol. Ass’n
of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Malcomb v. Island Creek Coal Co., 15 F.3d 364, 367,
369 (4th Cir. 1994); Int’l Rehabilitative Scis., Inc. v. Sebelius, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288–90 (W.D. Wash.
2010).
17 One group of scholars has summarized rule-of-law scholarship, concluding that “[t]he essential
elements to a legal regime based on the rule of law involve: (1) clear and understandable rules; (2)
predictability and certainty; (3) procedural validity in the formation of rules; and (4) rules independent of
individual whims of government officials and instead with a basis in established law.” Berkolow, Much Ado
About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation after
Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 309 (2008); accord Levy & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 503 (“While
the rule of law has various connotations and shades of meaning, at a minimum it reflects a core requirement of
legal regularity under which government actors derive their authority from, and are bound by, the law.”) In
administrative law, judicial review of agency decisions, including agency interpretations of statutes, can
promote all four of the elements that Berkolow articulated, but this Article focuses on the first two. Other
scholars have noted the significance of these elements, as well. See James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras,
Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 529 (2011) (“Clear, understandable precedent is necessary to
‘reduce[] transaction costs and wasted judicial effort, and encourage[] like cases to be treated alike—the
bedrock of equality and fairness.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Michael L. Eber, Comment, When the
Dissent Creates the Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities and the Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY L.J.
207, 233 (2008) (footnotes omitted))); Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality
Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 758 (1980) (noting that our system values “certainty, reliance, equality,
and efficiency”).
18 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 301; Levy & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 504; Linas E. Ledebur,
Comment, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a Divided Supreme Court, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 899,
919 (2009).
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legal conflicts among the lower courts and by providing definitive statements
of what the law is and what the law requires.19 From this bird’s-eye, and
admittedly pragmatic, view of judicial review, this Article begins from the
premise that, although the details of the Chevron deference framework have
become convoluted and unpredictable,20 a larger problem arises when judicial
review fails to give federal agencies, lower courts, and the general public a
clear decision regarding the validity of an agency’s implementation of a
statute. In other words, whatever level of deference the courts decide to give an
agency’s interpretation, what the agency and regulated entities want (or should
want) most from the reviewing courts is clear guidance regarding what they
can and cannot do under the statutory regime at issue.21 Thus, without ignoring
the very real complexities and problems that arise in applying the Chevron
framework, it is worth remembering that that framework is, most essentially, a
tool for assessing what is permissible under federal law.
Most discussions of the Supreme Court’s deference cases focus, naturally,
on the federal courts’ initial review of an agency interpretation—on issues
such as the kind of deference courts owe to various forms of agency
interpretation22 and the type of review each level of deference actually

19 Berkolow, supra note 17, at 306 (“Precedent is a means of enforcing rule-of-law values such as
continuity and predictability.”).
20 See Beermann, supra note 4, at 788–94; Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 848–52 (2001); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon,
Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1727, 1744, 1767 (2010).
21 See Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 457
(2009) (criticizing the courts for not providing clear guidance); James Michael Magee, Note, The Public Policy
Exception to Judicial Deferral of Labor Arbitration Awards—How Far Should Expansion Go?, 39 S.C. L.
REV. 465, 469 (1988) (noting criticism when the Court is too cryptic to provide guidance).
Of course, there are important distinctions between what the law requires of private entities and what it
requires of federal agencies, as well as corresponding distinctions between the federal courts’ interpretations of
statutes in Chevron evaluations and in the direct regulatory context. Under Chevron, courts are primarily
concerned with whether the agency is acting within a permissible sphere of interpretive authority. In contrast,
when directly interpreting how statutes apply to regulated entities, courts, by necessity, must arrive at a
particular meaning. See Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the “New” Nondelegation
Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5–8, 12–14 (2000) (discussing rule-of-law values and agency decision
making in the nondelegation context). For purposes of this Article, the distinctions between the requirements
for private entities and federal agencies are inconsequential because the issues are whether and when a federal
agency, through Chevron and Brand X, can supplant direct court interpretation.
22 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 4, at 556 (discussing difficulties in applying Mead); Nathan Alexander
Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory
Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497 (arguing that agencies’ determinations of the scope of their own
jurisdiction should not receive Chevron deference); Thomas Moore, Note, Abandoning Mead: Why Informal
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requires.23 In contrast, this Article focuses on the next round of agency action,
after the reviewing courts initially address, but do not fully resolve, the validity
of a prior agency interpretation. Specifically, it investigates the options that
remain for a federal agency when the Supreme Court reviews that agency’s
interpretation of a statute but reaches no majority decision regarding the
interpretation’s legal viability.
Plurality decisions24 remain a small—but not insignificant—percentage of
the Supreme Court’s decisions.25 Nevertheless, as Ken Kimura has observed,
“A plurality decision, by its very nature, represents the most unstable form of
case law.”26 In addition, empirical research indicates that the Court tends to
issue plurality decisions about the most divisive legal issues it faces—“when
the Court reviews politically salient and constitutional issues, and when there
was dissensus on the lower court.”27 Thus, the issues that tend to produce

Adjudications Should Only Receive Minimal Deference in Federal Courts, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 719, 725–32
(discussing inconsistent application of judicial deference to informal agency adjudications).
23 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009)
(comparing judicial roles under each step of the Chevron framework); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E.
Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1085–91 (2008) (discussing the wide variety of deference regimes the
Supreme Court has employed in reviewing agency actions post-Chevron); Kelly, supra note 4 (discussing
conflicting approaches to Chevron deference).
24 For purposes of this Article, a “plurality decision” is a decision of the Supreme Court in which less
than a majority of Justices agree on the rationale for a decision, even if a majority of Justices agree on the
disposition of the case itself. See Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 519. For example, a 5–4 decision to
remand would still be a plurality decision if three of the Justices constituting the majority offered one rationale
for remanding and the other two offered a different rationale. See, e.g., id. A “plurality opinion,” in contrast, is
a particular Justice’s rationale for a decision that is joined by fewer than a majority of the Justices. See
Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 101–
53 (1956), for one example of a more detailed typology of Supreme Court plurality decisions.
25 See Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 519 (calculating that plurality decisions constituted 3.4% of the
5,711 cases decided between 1953 and 2006—a significant increase over the period from 1801 to 1955);
Joseph M. Cacace, Note, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A Reexamination of
the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 100 (2007) (“[P]lurality
decisions . . . have become a conspicuous part of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.”); see also infra Part II
(discussing the frequency of, and the law surrounding, Supreme Court plurality opinions).
26 Ken Kimura, Note, The Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1593, 1594 (1992).
27 Pamela C. Corley et al., Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States
Supreme Court, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 180, 180 (2010); accord Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 527; James A.
Bloom, Note, Plurality and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States
v. Winstar Corp., 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2008); Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decision
Making, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1140 (1981); W. Jesse Weins, Note, A Problematic Plurality Precedent: Why
the Supreme Court Should Leave Marks over Van Orden v. Perry, 85 NEB. L. REV. 830, 831 (2007); Mark I.
Levy, Plurality Opinions, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 12, 2007, at 13.
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unstable plurality decisions are, perversely, the legal issues most in need of
clarification.
Plurality decisions “represent extreme dissensus” and create precedential
uncertainty because lower courts not only have to find the rationale for each
opinion but also must decide which opinion’s rationale governs.28 Discerning
this controlling rationale can be quite difficult.29 Indeed, at least one scholar
has referred to the interpretive task after a Supreme Court plurality opinion as
“reading . . . the ‘tea leaves.’”30
In the statutory context, the probability of a plurality decision has been
enhanced in the last few decades because the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
have been deeply divided regarding the proper methodology for statutory
interpretation. This deep division has often resulted in the Court issuing
majority and dissenting opinions that display fundamental differences in
interpretive approach,31 in the weight the Justices give to extrastatutory
concerns such as federalism,32 and in the final interpretations the Justices
offer.33 As a result, the Court does not always deliver clear majority opinions
in its statutory interpretation cases. For example, 4–4 decisions when one
Justice does not participate34 and, most problematically, decisions with
multiple opinions and no clear majority35 can leave both the lower courts and
28

See Corley et al., supra note 27, at 180, 181–83.
See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, and
Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 160 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), left “the individual states and lower courts to quarrel over the weight
and precedential value to be accorded to the case’s seven separate opinions”).
30 Marvin Zalman, Reading the Tea Leaves of Chavez v. Martinez: The Future of Miranda, 40 CRIM. L.
BULL. 299, 334 (2004).
31 See Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: Statutory Conversations
and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955, 958, 971–88
(2005).
32 Compare Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2312–13 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (focusing on
federalism concerns), and Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593–96 (2009) (Alito, J.) (same), with Alabama,
130 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (virtually ignoring federalism concerns), and Horne, 129 S. Ct. at
2628–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
33 See discussion infra Part III.
34 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 484 (2008) (demonstrating that the Court was
equally divided on the issue of respondeat superior liability when Justice Alito did not participate in the
decision).
35 See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (producing a particularly complex 5–
3–4–2–3 split among the Supreme Court Justices when the Court decided whether the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) applied to foreign-flagged vessels temporarily in U.S. waters, specifically addressing
whether there was a presumption that federal law applies to foreign vessels, what showing would be necessary
to overcome that presumption, and to what extent the otherwise-controlling exemption from ADA
29
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the implementing federal agency with the unenviable task of deciding what to
do next.
At one point, the Supreme Court’s plurality decisions were considered to
have little precedential value, binding on lower courts, if at all, only for the
exact holding and not for any legal rationale.36 However, the Supreme Court
has—admittedly, inconsistently37—insisted that a plurality opinion can be
identified as the ratio decidendi for a plurality decision and hence operate as
binding precedent.38 As a result, federal courts have their own frameworks for
discerning these binding rationales out of plurality decisions,39 most commonly
the Marks rule,40 which is discussed more thoroughly in Part II. Importantly
for this Article, because of the potential precedential status of plurality
decisions, lower federal courts are not free to pursue independent courses of
action in the wake of a Supreme Court plurality decision. Instead, they are
essentially stuck with the task of trying to interpret the various Justices’
opinions to decide how to apply them—or an identified ratio decidendi—to
new factual contexts.41
In contrast to the typical practice of lower federal courts, this Article argues
that after Brand X the post-plurality choices for federal agencies are not so

requirements would apply); see also Marceau, supra note 29, at 160 (noting that the Supreme Court’s plurality
decision in Baze left “the individual states and lower courts to quarrel over the weight and precedential value
to be accorded to the case’s seven separate opinions”); Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The Modern Problem of
Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 261
(2000) (“Real problems arise when there is less than a clear majority speaking for the Court—when the leading
opinion of the Court is a plurality opinion. A Supreme Court plurality decision holds ambiguous precedential
value.”).
36 See Marceau, supra note 29, at 164–66; Comment, supra note 24, at 100; Mark Alan Thurmon, Note,
When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42
DUKE L.J. 419, 420 (1992); see also Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 87, 95–98 (2002) (noting that “the general practice is to regard such a divided vote
as no decision at all” and detailing that plurality decisions in early United States law and still in most common
law jurisdictions “had no precedential value”).
37 See Bloom, supra note 27, at 1377 nn.20–22; Hochschild, supra note 35, at 282.
38 But see Marceau, supra note 29, at 161 (critiquing “the unchallenged assumption that plurality
opinions . . . generate reliably binding precedent in the context of capital appeals”).
39 See Kimura, supra note 26, at 1600–04 (discussing a variety of approaches courts have taken); Novak,
supra note 17, at 767–78 (same).
40 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (setting out the “narrowest grounds” analysis for
discerning the controlling rationale of plurality decisions); see also Ledebur, supra note 18, at 910–14
(discussing a variety of approaches to dealing with Supreme Court plurality decisions).
41 See Marceau, supra note 29, at 162 (noting that, given stare decisis, “a published decision that does not
contain any single rationale for judgment that is supported by a majority of the Court presents a unique
predicament for judges and lawyers alike”).
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limited. Specifically, in the face of contradictory or irreconcilable plurality
opinions from Supreme Court Justices regarding the viability of an agency’s
prior interpretation of a statute, a federal agency faces a choice: it can try to
interpret the Court, or it may begin anew in interpreting the statute.
When choosing between these two responses, however, the agency faces
what this Article refers to as the “deference conundrum.” By following the first
post-plurality path, the agency effectively chooses to defer to the Supreme
Court’s “decision” by trying to honor the Justices’ plurality opinions. In doing
so, the agency gives up its own claim to interpretive deference. Agencies that
pursue this first path behave essentially as the lower courts do, attempting to
discern a controlling rationale from the various Justices’ opinions.
Accordingly, the post-plurality agency moves itself one step away from the
Chevron/Mead/Skidmore deference framework42 because the agency is no
longer an agency interpreting a statute that it implements. Instead, it is an
agency interpreting a court interpreting a statute. As a result, the Supreme
Court’s Chevron/Brand X rationales for deferring to the agency’s new
implementation of the statute disappear because the agency is no longer acting
pursuant to congressionally delegated lawmaking authority. Rather, the agency
is taking over a quintessentially judicial function.
Alternatively, and with some admitted risk for the next round of judicial
review, the post-plurality agency could treat the plurality decision as either a
nondecision regarding statutory meaning or as proof positive that the statute is
ambiguous for purposes of Chevron Step One. Of course, pragmatically, the
agency should not ignore the Court’s plurality decisions regarding the
legitimacy of its own interpretation because, depending on how many opinions
the Justices produced and how exactly those opinions align, it may be clear
that the Court has effectively bounded the statutory ambiguity in some way.
Nevertheless, by following this second post-plurality path, the agency treats
the Justices’ opinions as data points regarding the statute’s meaning while
retaining primary authority to interpret the statute.
The legal question is whether an agency will receive Chevron deference if
it follows this second path. This Article argues that it should. Specifically,
under the logic of Chevron and Brand X, if the agency, in the absence of the
plurality decision, would otherwise be entitled to Chevron deference for its
second-round interpretation, it should remain entitled to full Chevron

42

See infra Part I.A–B, for a discussion of this framework.
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deference despite the fact that its new interpretation comes in the wake of a
Supreme Court plurality decision regarding the viability of the prior
interpretation. In addition, the agency’s new interpretation will likely better
promote the values of clarity, uniformity, equality, and fairness than the
Supreme Court’s plurality decision.
This Article explores the deference conundrum for post-plurality federal
agencies—agencies coping with a Supreme Court plurality decision regarding
the legitimacy of a prior agency interpretation of an agency-implemented
statute. Part I outlines the Chevron/Mead/Skidmore framework and discusses
the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Brand X, which extended Chevron
deference to agency interpretations that change federal court precedent. Part II
provides an overview of Supreme Court plurality decisions, detailing their
frequency, discussing their legal import, and analyzing lower courts’ responses
to them. However, because not all Supreme Court plurality decisions create the
deference conundrum for federal agencies, Part III provides a typology of
plurality decisions involving agency-mediated statutes and analyzes the
potential relevance of Chevron and Brand X for each category. Part IV presents
a case study of the deference conundrum—the joint response of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Army Corps) to the Supreme Court’s fractured interpretation of the
federal Clean Water Act (CWA) in Rapanos v. United States.43 It then
recommends an alternative regulatory approach, especially salient in light of
Congress’s unwillingness to intervene and the split that has developed among
the federal courts of appeals regarding how to analyze CWA jurisdiction. The
Article concludes by arguing that if the Supreme Court punts the issue of
determining, decisively, whether an agency interpretation of a statute is valid,
particularly in a regulatory context, values of clarity and uniformity dictate that
administrative agencies should exercise their authority under Chevron and
Brand X to reinterpret the statutes that they administer.
I. THE CONVOLUTIONS OF CHEVRON, MEAD, SKIDMORE, AND BRAND X
A. Agency Interpretations of Statutes: Basic Chevron Deference
It has been a truism from the earliest days of the Supreme Court that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the

43

547 U.S. 715 (2006).
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law is.”44 However, given the rise of the administrative state in the federal
government, the Supreme Court now often confronts issues of statutory
construction with a mediating agency interpretation already in place. Such
agency interpretations force federal courts to confront the possibility that
Congress preferred that an entity within the Executive Branch construe the
statutory scheme at issue.45 Since at least 1984, the Supreme Court has
respected this congressional preference, most commonly through the doctrine
of Chevron deference.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,46 which
involved the EPA’s rather technical interpretation of the federal Clean Air
Act,47 the Supreme Court created a two-step process for reviewing an agency’s
interpretation of an agency-administered statute. When applying Chevron,
federal courts first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.”48 “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”49 However, if Congress’s intent
is not clear—if there is an ambiguity or gap in the statutory scheme—the
federal court proceeds to the second step in the analysis, asking “whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”50
The Chevron Court clearly recognized that it was subordinating the federal
courts’ interpretive authority to that of administrative agencies. Thus, if the
reviewing court “determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative

44

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Whether this congressional preference is objectively “true” for any given statute, or even most statutes,
has been debated at length by scholars, see, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 712–17 (1997), and Supreme Court Justices, see, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our
Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 267 (2002); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514–17. Nevertheless, this congressional
preference is the legal fiction upon which Chevron and, even more extensively, Mead rest, and it is beyond the
scope of this Article to challenge that foundation.
46 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
47 Id. at 839–42 (describing the EPA’s interpretation of “stationary source” under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q
(2006))).
48 Id. at 842.
49 Id. at 842–43.
50 Id. at 843.
45
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interpretation.”51 Instead, respect for Congress dictates respect for the agency
to which Congress “entrusted” the statutory scheme.52 Moreover, the agency’s
interpretation is entitled to such respect regardless of whether Congress’s
delegation of authority was explicit or implicit.53
The Court also indicated that deference to administrative agencies is
particularly warranted when the agency’s interpretation involves legislativelike policy choices in a highly complex and technical area of law—choices
with respect to which the federal courts have no particular expertise or
legitimacy.54 As a result, when litigants challenge “the wisdom of [an]
agency’s policy,” rather than its reasonableness under the relevant statute, the
challenge must fail: “federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”55
B. Limiting Chevron Deference: Christensen, Mead, and Skidmore
Chevron deference clearly remains available to federal agencies
interpreting statutes that they administer. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, the Supreme Court progressively limited the
circumstances under which federal agencies’ interpretations would receive full
Chevron deference.
In its 2000 decision in Christensen v. Harris County56 and its 2001 decision
in United States v. Mead Corp.,57 the Supreme Court determined that both the
quality of the agency’s decision-making process and the character of its
delegated authority were relevant to the amount of deference, if any, the
agency’s statutory interpretation would receive. In Christensen, the Court held
that an agency opinion letter issued under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
193858 (FLSA) was not entitled to Chevron deference because it did not carry
the force of law.59 In particular, the Court emphasized that the agency had not

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 843–44.
Id. at 865–66.
Id. at 866.
529 U.S. 576, 587–88 (2000).
533 U.S. 218, 227–29 (2001).
Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006)).
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
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arrived at its interpretation through deliberative proceedings, such as formal
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.60
Although the agency’s interpretation was not entitled to Chevron deference,
the Court held it was still entitled to some deference pursuant to Skidmore v.
Swift & Co.61 Under Skidmore, agency interpretations of statutes are entitled to
deference, “but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to
persuade.’”62 More specifically, “The weight [accorded to an agency
interpretation] in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”63
Christensen thus suggested that the type of procedures that the agency used
in issuing its interpretation would determine the level of deference that the
interpretation received. Mead expanded the deference inquiry into the nature of
the agency’s statutory authority.64 According to the Mead Court,
“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies
for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.”65 The Court recognized that “agencies charged with applying a
statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices,” and hence, “[t]he fair
measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been
understood to vary with circumstances.”66 The factors relevant to the level of
deference accorded include “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s
position.”67
The Mead Court also noted that when an agency has authority to act with
the force of law and uses that authority to resolve a statutory ambiguity or to
fill a statutory gap, Chevron deference applies with full force. As it had in
Chevron, the Court emphasized:
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id.
Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 227–28.
Id. at 228 (footnotes omitted).
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[A] reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency’s exercise of
its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory
ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems
unwise, but is obliged to accept the agency’s position if Congress has
not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s
68
interpretation is reasonable.

Moreover, an agency’s failure to announce its interpretation through formal
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking does not necessarily obviate
Chevron deference.69
Nevertheless, the Court held that the Custom Service’s tariff rulings at
issue did not warrant Chevron deference.70 As a statutory matter, the Court
concluded that “the terms of the congressional delegation give no indication
that Congress meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification
rulings with the force of law.”71 The Customs Service itself did not view the
tariff rulings as having the general force of law because they were binding only
between itself and the relevant importer.72 Moreover, “46 different Customs
offices issue 10,000 to 15,000 of them each year.”73
Mead thus complicated Christensen’s relatively simple focus on the
procedures an agency uses. In his lengthy dissent, Justice Scalia anticipated
“protracted confusion,”74 arguing that “[w]e will be sorting out the
consequences of the Mead doctrine . . . for years to come.”75 Much scholarship
supports his prediction.76

68 Id. at 229 (citation omitted) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–46 (1984)).
69 Id. at 230–31.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 231–32.
72 Id. at 233.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 239.
76 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1577–78 (2006); Amy J. Wildermuth, What Twombly and Mead
Have in Common, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 276, 277–78 (2008); Estella F. Chen, Note, Judicial
Deference After United States v. Mead: How Streamlining Measures at the Board of Immigration Appeals
May Transform Traditional Notions of Deference in Immigration Law, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 657, 677–78
(2006). See generally Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What Would Justice
Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877 (2006) (providing a summary of scholars’ arguments regarding the
continued confusion resulting from Mead).
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C. Agencies, Federal Court Precedent, and the Meaning of Statutes: The
Brand X Complication
1. The Brand X Decision
Christensen and Mead clearly limit the availability of Chevron deference,
even if the exact boundaries between Chevron and Skidmore deference remain
hazy. In contrast, in its 2005 decision in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services77 (Brand X), the
Supreme Court expanded the availability of Chevron deference and the
authority of federal agencies to control the meaning of the statutes that they
implement. In Brand X, the Court reviewed the Federal Communications
Commission’s (FCC) declaratory ruling that cable companies providing
broadband Internet access are exempt from regulation under Title II of the
Telecommunications
Act,78
which
subjects
all
providers
of
“telecommunications servic[e]” to mandatory common-carrier regulation.79 In
March 2000, the FCC concluded that broadband Internet service provided by
cable companies is an “information service,” but not a telecommunications
service, “[b]ecause Internet access provides a capability for manipulating and
storing information” and because of “[t]he integrated nature of Internet access
and the high-speed wire used to provide Internet access.”80
Ultimately, on the merits, the Court upheld the FCC’s decision under both
Chevron81 and an arbitrary-and-capricious analysis.82 However, before
reaching the merits, eight Justices agreed that federal agencies can “overrule”
federal court constructions of statutes that the agencies administer.83
Specifically, the Court concluded that “[o]nly a judicial precedent holding that
the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore
contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency
construction.”84 Moreover, the agency’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron
deference if it otherwise qualifies for such deference.85
77

545 U.S. 967 (2005).
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
79 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 974 (alteration in original).
80 Id. at 977–79.
81 Id. at 980–82.
82 See id. at 1000–02 (finding that the FCC provided adequate rational justification for its conclusions).
83 Id. at 982–83.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 982.
78
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In Brand X itself, numerous parties petitioned for judicial review of the
FCC’s declaratory ruling, and a judicial lottery sent the case to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Rather than use the Chevron analysis to
review the FCC’s construction of the Telecommunications Act, the Ninth
Circuit invalidated the ruling based on its own precedent in AT&T Corp. v.
City of Portland.86
The Supreme Court, however, held that the Ninth Circuit should have used
the Chevron analysis, not its own precedent, to evaluate the FCC’s
construction of the Telecommunications Act. First, the Court reasoned, the
Chevron analysis applied because Congress had delegated to the FCC authority
to execute and enforce the Telecommunications Act and “the Commission
issued the order under review in the exercise of that authority.”87
Second, with regard to the role of federal courts’ constructions in the first
step of the Chevron analysis, the Court stated, “A court’s prior judicial
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to
Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for
agency discretion.”88 The Brand X Court reasoned that “allowing a judicial
precedent to foreclose an agency from interpreting an ambiguous statute, as the
Court of Appeals assumed it could, would allow a court’s interpretation to
override an agency’s. Chevron’s premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to
fill statutory gaps.”89 The Court also distinguished its own precedent in Neal v.
United States,90 in which the existence of a prior Court construction resulted in
the Court granting no deference to the agency’s different interpretation, on the
grounds that the judicial precedent at issue in Neal “had held the relevant
statute to be unambiguous.”91
Third, the Supreme Court indicated that federal court precedent renders a
statute unambiguous only if the court’s decision clearly indicates that its
reading is “the only permissible reading of the statute.”92 The Ninth Circuit’s
decision in City of Portland did not achieve this level of exclusiveness because
86 Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1128–32 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing AT&T Corp. v. City
of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875–79 (9th Cir. 2000)), rev’d, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
87 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980–81.
88 Id. at 982.
89 Id.
90 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
91 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)).
92 Id.

CRAIG GALLEYSFINAL

18

11/1/2011 12:56 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1

the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly hold that the Telecommunications Act was
unambiguous regarding whether cable Internet providers were
“telecommunications carriers.”93
The Brand X Court’s rationale was thus much the same as the Chevron
Court’s: Congress delegates to federal agencies the authority to implement and
interpret the statutes at issue, and hence, out of respect for Congress, the
agencies’ interpretations are to be preferred to those of the courts.94
Nevertheless, Brand X goes one step further than Chevron, requiring federal
courts not only to respect existing agency interpretations but also to actively
subordinate their own prior interpretations of federal statutes to the later
decisions of federal agencies. While the Supreme Court is still wrestling with
the implications of this view of the federal courts’ role, especially in
connection with its own prior decisions, the lower courts have been steadily
applying Brand X to conflicts between agency and court interpretations.95
2. Brand X in the Lower Federal Courts
While the cases to which the Brand X rule applies have been fairly limited,
the lower federal courts have generally applied the rule to achieve the results
that the Supreme Court dictated: agency interpretations of statutes receive
Chevron deference despite existing court precedent to the contrary, and in fact,
such agency interpretations can supersede that precedent. In one of the earliest
cases applying Brand X, for example, the First Circuit set aside its own prior
decision, which had concluded that applications for thermal variances under
the CWA require a formal adjudication in accordance with the Federal
93

Id. at 984–85.
Id. at 982.
95 See Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude that under
the principles outlined in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, a
subsequent, reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute, which avoids raising serious
constitutional doubts, is due deference notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s earlier contrary interpretation of
the statute.” (citation omitted)); Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 502–03 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Brand X for the proposition that if a court interprets an ambiguous statute one way, and an agency
subsequently interprets the same statute another way, even the same court cannot ignore the agency’s
interpretation); Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Brand X but noting that
the decision did nothing to alter the effect of a finding that Congress spoke clearly to the issue under Chevron
Step One); Gonzales v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the proviso
that a court must accord Chevron deference to an agency’s subsequent interpretation only if the “court’s earlier
precedent was an interpretation of a statutory ambiguity”); Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson,
443 F.3d 12, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the Supreme Court’s intent in Brand X was to eliminate the
possibility that Chevron applicability would turn on the order in which judicial and agency interpretations
issue).
94
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Administrative Procedure Act96 (APA), in favor of the EPA’s new
interpretation that the statutory “public hearing” could be something less than a
full-blown evidentiary hearing.97 The First Circuit emphasized that its prior
decision came before not only the EPA’s interpretation but also before
Chevron itself and that its precedent merely established a presumption in favor
of formal adjudication, not a definitive reading of the CWA provisions at
issue.98 Several other courts have similarly applied the Brand X rule.99 In
addition, the Third Circuit extended the Brand X rule to agency interpretations
of regulations that contradict the court’s prior interpretations.100
When lower federal courts resist the elimination of their own precedent
pursuant to Brand X, they do so for one of two reasons. First, lower courts may
consider judicial precedent to be so definitive or long established that it
embodies the only allowable interpretation of the statute at issue, effectively
rendering the statute unambiguous. For example, in 2006, the U.S. Tax Court
went out of its way to distinguish Brand X and refused to accord Chevron
deference to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulation that contradicted
long-standing court precedent.101 The Tax Court differentiated Brand X on
several grounds. Unlike the FCC’s careful consideration of the statute and its
policies during the promulgation of its regulation in Brand X, the IRS’s
“rationale for adopting the disputed regulations [wa]s at best perfunctory.”102
In addition, the FCC’s regulations in Brand X were new, while the IRS was
changing regulations that had been in place since 1957, raising additional

96

Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 14–17 (1st Cir. 2006) (distinguishing Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v.
Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 877–78 (1st Cir. 1978)).
98 Id. at 16–17; accord 33 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), 1342(a) (2006) (requiring a “public hearing” under the
CWA).
99 See, e.g., Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1078, 1086–88 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that its interpretation of the discretionary waiver of inadmissibility in immigration had been
superseded by the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) interpretation); Fernandez, 502 F.3d at 347–48
(concluding that the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s phrase “national of the
United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2006), superseded the court’s own interpretation of that phrase in
United States v. Morin, 80 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 1996)).
100 See Levy, 544 F.3d at 502–03 (extending Brand X’s logic and giving deference to the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s interpretation of its own regulation, even though the agency’s interpretation
contradicted Third Circuit precedent). This extension is logical because agencies typically receive even greater
deference than Chevron deference from the courts regarding their interpretations of their own regulations. See
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (establishing this rule of greater deference).
101 Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 143–47 (2006), vacated, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir.
2008).
102 Id. at 144.
97
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issues regarding their reasonableness.103 Moreover, whereas the FCC had not
been a party in the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision, the IRS had been a party in
all other cases that had interpreted the statutory provision at issue.104 The Ninth
Circuit precedent in Brand X was only five years old, whereas the IRS was
trying to change a court interpretation that had been in place since 1938.105
Finally, although the prior court decisions regarding that interpretation of the
tax code were not explicit that their interpretation was the only permissible
one, the Tax Court nevertheless concluded that the required exclusivity was
apparent in the opinions.106
On appeal, however, the Third Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s decision,
concluding that the IRS regulation was both entitled to Chevron deference107
and valid.108 The Third Circuit applied Brand X at Chevron Step One and
disagreed with the Tax Court that prior courts had effectively determined that
their interpretation was the only one possible.109 “Accordingly,” it concluded,
“we are not bound by previous judicial interpretations.”110 Similar Brand X
debates about the effect of precedent on statutory ambiguity have occurred in
other courts as well, with similar results.111
Second, and more relevant to this Article, lower courts will refuse to allow
the Brand X rule to overturn their own precedent when that existing precedent
has already considered the agency regulation or interpretation at issue. For
example, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) to use Brand X to resurrect an interpretation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) that the Ninth Circuit had previously determined was
unreasonable under Chevron.112 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that in Brand X,
its prior decision “had not even considered an agency interpretation of the
Communications Act, nor had we applied Chevron deference when we
103

Id.
Id. at 144–45.
105 Id. at 145.
106 Id. at 146–47.
107 Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2008).
108 Id. at 168–72.
109 Id. at 170.
110 Id.
111 Compare, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164,
1173–74 (D. Minn. 2007) (concluding that Brand X did not apply because the court’s precedent declared the
tax code provision at issue unambiguous), rev’d en banc, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 704
(2011), with Mayo, 568 F.3d at 679–83 (reversing the district court, declaring the statute ambiguous, and
applying Chevron deference to the tax regulation).
112 Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
104
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interpreted the statute.”113 In contrast, with respect to the BIA’s proffered
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit had previously fully considered that
interpretation through a Chevron analysis and rejected it as unreasonable.114
Brand X, according to the court, did not provide “that an agency may resurrect
a statutory interpretation that a circuit court has foreclosed by rejecting it as
unreasonable at Chevron’s second step.”115 Instead, the Ninth Circuit precedent
remained viable, the agency’s recycled interpretation remained unreasonable,
and the agency approach at issue was deemed invalid.116 Similarly, in a series
of cases applying the FLSA, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims concluded that
the Brand X rule does not apply when the agency interpretation predated the
court precedent at issue and the prior court fully considered that interpretation
in its application of the statute.117
Lower court applications of Brand X thus point out an important
dichotomy. Brand X applies when the federal courts had the first chance to
interpret an ambiguous statute that an agency implements, and it is unlikely
that lower court judicial precedent—no matter how long established—will be
deemed to have eliminated any inherent statutory ambiguity. However, if the
judicial precedent at issue fully addressed the agency’s proffered
interpretation, an agency cannot use Brand X to circumvent the court’s prior
resolution. Instead, principles of stare decisis prevail. As Part III will discuss,
the Supreme Court plurality decisions of interest to this Article complicate this
rather neat dichotomy because they both engage an existing agency
interpretation and fail to invalidate decisively the agency’s view.
3. The Remaining Issue: Will the U.S. Supreme Court Apply Brand X to
Itself?
While the lower federal courts are developing a coherent Brand X
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has so far failed to extend that coherence to
its own decisions. Indeed, in Brand X itself, Justice Stevens concurred
specifically to emphasize that the Court’s decisions may warrant different
treatment:

113

Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1112–13 (citing Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005)).
115 Id. at 1114.
116 Id. at 1115; accord Escobar v. Holder, 567 F.3d 466, 478–80 (9th Cir. 2009) (reaching the same
conclusion in essentially identical language), vacated, 572 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009).
117 Garner v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 756, 765–66 (2009); Stocum v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 217,
225–26 (2008); Hamilton v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 206, 214–15 (2008).
114
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While I join the Court’s opinion in full, I add this caveat
concerning Part III-B, which correctly explains why a court of
appeals’ interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a regulatory
statute does not foreclose a contrary reading by the agency. That
explanation would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by this
118
Court that would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity.

In 2009, the Supreme Court split 5–4 in deciding Cuomo v. Clearing House
Ass’n regarding the role that Brand X should play when the Court’s own
precedent otherwise resolves the interpretive debate at issue.119 In Cuomo, the
attorney general for the State of New York sent letters to several national
banks, “in lieu of subpoena,” asking for certain nonpublic information to
ascertain whether the banks were complying with the state’s fair-lending
laws.120 The Federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the
Clearing House Association brought suit to enjoin the request, claiming that
the OCC’s National Bank Act (NBA) regulations preempted state law
enforcement against national banks.121 The NBA states,
No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers
except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of
justice or such as shall be, or have been exercised or directed by
Congress or by either House thereof or by any committee of
Congress or of either House duly authorized.122
The OCC’s regulation implementing this provision, adopted through noticeand-comment rulemaking, defines visitorial powers to include, inter alia,
“[i]nspection of a bank’s books and records” and “[e]nforcing compliance with
any applicable federal or state laws concerning” activities authorized or
permitted pursuant to federal banking law.123
The question for the Supreme Court was whether the OCC regulation
preempted enforcement of nonbanking state laws against national banks. The
majority stated both that the Chevron doctrine provided the framework for
evaluating the OCC’s regulation and that “[t]here is necessarily some
ambiguity as to the meaning of the statutory term ‘visitorial powers,’
118 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (emphases added).
119 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
120 Id. at 2714 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 Id.
122 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
123 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2)(ii), (iv) (2011).
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especially since we are working in an era when the prerogative writs—through
which visitorial powers were traditionally enforced—are not in vogue.”124
Thus, the case seemed ripe for deference to the OCC’s interpretation that state
enforcement was preempted.
Nevertheless, the majority was unwilling to defer to the OCC, emphasizing
that under Supreme Court precedent, visitorial powers referred to the state-assovereign’s supervisory role over corporations and charitable institutions.125 As
a result, the Court concluded that “[t]he Comptroller’s regulation . . . does not
comport with the statute.”126 Thus, according to the majority, Court precedent
trumped a potential application of the Brand X rule, and the Court’s prior
interpretation of a statute settled the issue of statutory meaning, regardless of
the potential statutory ambiguities that otherwise would have existed.
However, the dissenters—Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy and Alito—would have applied Brand X. They agreed
with the majority that the term visitorial powers was ambiguous.127 However,
they would have upheld the OCC’s regulatory interpretation as reasonable.128
Importantly, the dissenters specifically disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that the OCC’s interpretation “is unreasonable because it conflicts
with several of this Court’s decisions.”129 They instead noted that under Brand
X, the New York attorney general
cannot prevail by simply showing that this Court previously adopted
a construction of § 484 that differs from the interpretation later
chosen by the agency. “A court’s prior judicial construction of a
statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron
deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no
130
room for agency discretion.”

According to the dissenters, therefore, even Supreme Court precedent “is
insufficient to deny Chevron deference to OCC’s construction of § 484(a).”131
124

Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715.
See id. at 2716–17 (noting that the Court’s precedents confirm “that a sovereign’s ‘visitorial powers’
and its power to enforce the law are two different things”).
126 Id. at 2719.
127 Id. at 2722 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128 Id. at 2722–27.
129 Id. at 2728.
130 Id. at 2728–29 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005)).
131 Id. at 2730.
125
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The Supreme Court still has not used Brand X to displace its own
precedent. Nevertheless, the dissenters in Cuomo suggest that the Justices may
someday soon directly grapple with the Brand X rule’s implications for the
Court’s own interpretations of agency-implemented federal statutes. Moreover,
as will be discussed in Part III, even if the Supreme Court does eventually
exempt its majority decisions from the Brand X rule, good arguments remain
that Brand X should apply to Supreme Court plurality decisions regarding the
meaning of statutes that federal agencies implement. First, however, this
Article will examine Supreme Court plurality decisions more generally.
II. SUPREME COURT PLURALITY DECISIONS
As many scholars have noted, the Supreme Court’s practice of issuing
plurality decisions is generally criticized.132 According to these arguments,
with which this Article largely agrees, Supreme Court plurality decisions upset
the normal operation of binding precedent in lower courts.133 More
specifically, such decisions fail to provide clear and majoritarian reasoning for
the legal result,134 increase the work for lower courts,135 potentially perpetuate
or create splits of authority,136 and, in general, represent an abdication of the
Supreme Court’s responsibilities as the ultimate legal decision maker.137

132 E.g., Bloom, supra note 27, at 1373; Note, supra note 27, at 1127; Weins, supra note 27, at 831. But
see Berkolow, supra note 17, at 348–49 (arguing that the indeterminacy created by plurality decisions can
allow for valuable re-percolation of legal rules because “pluralities might indicate that the full Court was not
yet ready or capable to fully resolve an interpretation, thereby signaling to the lower courts and other branches
that they should make attempts to clarify the state of law”); Bloom, supra note 27, at 1417 (“Plurality
decisions . . . initiate a type of normative dialogue between the Supreme Court and the lower courts, one which
can contribute to the development of the law and help the law meet the demands of a changing society . . . .”);
Novak, supra note 17, at 759–60 (arguing that plurality decisions allow for judicial freedom and flexibility).
133 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 320; Ledebur, supra note 18, at 905; Note, supra note 27, at 1127.
134 Ledebur, supra note 18, at 903.
135 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 301; Bloom, supra note 27, at 1373, 1378.
136 See Levmore, supra note 36, at 100; Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 530–31 (“[T]he ambiguity and
confusion created by plurality decisions can lead lower courts to ‘experiment with alternative rules and
outcomes based on their own criteria,’ which can lead to an altered evolution of the law.” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Pamela C. Corley, Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality
Opinions, 37 AM. POL. RES. 30, 34 (2009))); Bloom, supra note 27, at 1378 (“[P]luralities obstruct the
predictive function of law . . . .”).
137 Bloom, supra note 27, at 1373, 1378; Kimura, supra note 26, at 1625; Ledebur, supra note 18, at 919;
Note, supra note 27, at 1128; see also Thurmon, supra note 36, at 419 (“[P]lurality decisions often do ‘more to
confuse the current state of the law than to clarify it.’” (quoting John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds,
Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62)).
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At the outset, it is worth noting that the difficulties that Supreme Court
plurality opinions cause derive directly from the American legal system’s
expectation of binding majority decisions.138 This expectation is itself a
Supreme Court invention.139 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Chief
Justice John Marshall purposely changed the Justices’ prior practice—
consistent with the practice in England—of announcing individual seriatim
opinions.140 Seriatim opinions, of course, left lower courts with all of the same
problems of discerning a governing legal rationale for the ultimate resolution
that plurality decisions do now.141 To resolve this problem, but more
importantly to increase the Supreme Court’s authority and legitimacy in the
early Republic, Chief Justice Marshall initiated the now well-established
practice of the Supreme Court issuing unified majority—and preferably
unanimous—opinions.142
Whatever its origin or quirkiness, the expectation of binding majority
opinions has become the American norm. As a result, both the Supreme Court
itself and legal scholarship have devoted much attention to how lower courts
should deal with143 the increasing number144 of Supreme Court plurality
138 See Kimura, supra note 26, at 1596–98 (discussing the principle of majoritarianism in Supreme Court
decision making); Novak, supra note 17, at 757–61 (discussing the value of majority opinions and rationales).
139 Marceau, supra note 29, at 164–66.
140 Hochschild, supra note 35, at 283–85; Ledebur, supra note 18, at 902.
141 See Ledebur, supra note 18, at 902; see also Marceau, supra note 29, at 162 (arguing that, given stare
decisis, “a published decision that does not contain any single rationale for judgment that is supported by a
majority of the Court presents a unique predicament for judges and lawyers alike”).
142 Marceau, supra note 29, at 166; Hochschild, supra note 35, at 267–68; Thurmon, supra note 36, at
427.
143 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 27, at 1374 (arguing that the courts need a consistent method for
interpreting plurality decisions). Not everyone accepts, however, that nonmajority opinions should establish
binding precedent. Linas Ledebur, for example, has argued that “[i]t seems logical that if cases are to be
decided by a group of Justices, a majority of them must be required for the ruling to be binding.” Ledebur,
supra note 18, at 902–03.
144 Various scholars have counted Supreme Court plurality decisions in different ways, but all agree that
the numbers of such decisions increased in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. A 1981 note in
the Harvard Law Review reported that between 1801 and 1955, the Supreme Court issued 45 plurality
decisions; from 1955 through the end of the Warren Court, 42 plurality decisions; and by 1981 in the Burger
Court, 88 plurality decisions. Note, supra note 27, at 1127 n.1. A January 2011 study concurs, finding only 45
Supreme Court plurality decisions between 1801 and 1955 (145 Terms) but 195 plurality decisions from 1953
to 2006 (54 Terms). Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 519; accord Berkolow, supra note 17, at 302
(“[P]lurality opinions have proliferated in the Supreme Court.”); Davis & Reynolds, supra note 137, at 60–61
(presenting counts of plurality opinions to conclude that there has been a “distinct increase in the Court’s resort
to the plurality opinion”); Marceau, supra note 29, at 168 (noting the increasing numbers of Supreme Court
plurality decisions); Cacace, supra note 25, at 97–98 (noting that “[t]he Court has handed down a steadily
increasing number of plurality decisions throughout its history” and discussing a variety of explanations for the
phenomenon); Hochschild, supra note 35, at 272 (“Fractured opinions have increased dramatically since Chief
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decisions in the last few decades. In 1977, for example, the Court established
the Marks “narrowest grounds” rule,145 which one scholar has described as “a
conscious attempt to end the confusion surrounding plurality decisions’
precedential value.”146
On the merits, Marks involved due process challenges to the defendants’
criminal convictions for transporting obscene materials in violation of federal
statutes.147 One potentially precedential Supreme Court decision was Memoirs
v. Massachusetts, a plurality decision where the Justices split 3–2–4.148 At its
core, the issue in Marks was which standard of obscenity the government had
to meet in order to convict the defendants: (1) the standard from Miller v.
California (applied retroactively), which worked against the defendants;149 (2)
the Supreme Court’s last majority enunciation of an obscenity test in Roth v.
United States, which the court of appeals viewed as very similar to the Miller
standard;150 or (3) the Memoirs plurality standard, which favored the
defendants.151
The court of appeals determined that the Memoirs standard could not
govern because there was no binding majority rationale. As the Supreme Court
summarized, the court of appeals
noted—correctly—that the Memoirs standards never commanded the
assent of more than three Justices at any one time, and it apparently
concluded from this fact that Memoirs never became the law. By this
line of reasoning, one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal
liability by looking not to Memoirs but to Roth v. United States, the
last comparable plenary decision of this Court prior to Miller in
which a majority united in a single opinion announcing the rationale
152
behind the Court’s holding.

Justice Marshall’s tenure.”); Ledebur, supra note 18, at 900 (“The second half of the twentieth century has
seen a significant rise in dissension in the Court. That dissension has continued to exist, even in the current
Court whose Chief Justice has made it a mission to promote unanimity.” (footnote omitted)); Levy, supra note
27, at 13 (“[R]ecently, . . . plurality decisions have proliferated.”).
145 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
146 Hochschild, supra note 35, at 279; accord Comment, supra note 24, at 154–55 (detailing the variety of
ways in which lower courts treated Supreme Court plurality decisions before Marks); Thurmon, supra note 36,
at 420 (describing the Marks rule as a means of assessing the precedential value of a plurality decision).
147 Marks, 430 U.S. at 189.
148 Id. at 190 (citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)).
149 Id. at 189–90 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
150 Id. at 192–93 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
151 Id. at 190–91.
152 Id. at 192–93 (citation omitted).
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded, the court of appeals had gotten
the analysis wrong. Instead of dismissing the plurality decision in Memoirs, the
Court reasoned, the lower court should have applied what has now become
known as the Marks rule: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’”153 As applied
to Memoirs, the Marks rule meant that the plurality opinion did operate as
controlling precedent because the two concurring Justices who provided the
fourth and fifth votes for the actual resolution offered broader grounds for
obscenity convictions than the plurality did.154
The Marks narrowest grounds rule sounds simple, and it can work quite
well when the Supreme Court Justices actually offer “nested”—or
progressively expanding—rationales in their plurality opinions (the “Russian
dolls” model of plurality decisions).155 As has been widely observed, however,
the Marks rule offers little guidance when Supreme Court Justices offer
unrelated rationales for a decision.156 As a result, a number of commentators
have both recognized that the lower courts vary widely in their applications of
Marks to the Supreme Court’s plurality decisions157 and offered alternative
strategies of their own.158

153 Id. at 193 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
154 Id. at 193–94.
155 E.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial
Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (1993); accord Berkolow, supra note 17, at 326–33 (“Where the Marks rule
does easily apply, in those opinions written along a continuum of broad to narrow reasoning, it is an
enormously useful doctrine that provides guidance for lower courts deciphering fractured decisions.”).
156 Berkolow, supra note 17, at 333; Marceau, supra note 29, at 169; Thurmon, supra note 36, at 442.
157 See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 29, at 170–74 (explaining the “common denominator” and “predictive”
approaches to applying the Marks rule); Cacace, supra note 25, at 122–25 (recognizing three approaches to
applying Marks—the narrowest grounds approach, the “conventional view,” and the “social choice view”);
Thurmon, supra note 36, at 429–42 (describing in detail two models for applying the Marks rule—the
“implicit consensus” and predictive model); Weins, supra note 27, at 835–38 (detailing the implicit-consensus
and predictive approaches to applying the Marks rule).
158 See, e.g., Davis & Reynolds, supra note 137, at 81–85 (urging stronger leadership within the Court to
avoid plurality decisions); Bloom, supra note 27, at 1412–16 (recommending the “simple reconciliation” and
“policy space” methods); Kimura, supra note 26, at 1604–11 (offering a “legitimacy model” for interpreting
Supreme Court plurality decisions based on fidelity to existing precedent); Ledebur, supra note 18, at 914
(proposing to disallow concurring opinions); Thurmon, supra note 36, at 451–56 (offering an alternative
approach to plurality decisions that emphasizes the role of imperative and persuasive authority in the Justices’
reasoning).
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With very limited exceptions, however, the jurisprudence and scholarship
of plurality decisions have focused on the interpretive dilemma facing the
lower courts. Lower courts, of course, are bound to follow precedent
established in higher courts, even when discerning what the precedent is may
be difficult.159 However, as Chevron itself makes clear, federal agencies
occupy a preferred position with respect to their authority to interpret statutes.
Structurally, unlike lower federal courts, agencies are creations of the
Legislative Branch and operate, for the most part, out of the Executive
Branch.160 Under Chevron and Brand X, a federal agency’s interpretation of a
statute that it implements, at least when issued through fairly formalized
procedures pursuant to delegated lawmaking authority, is entitled to deference
and can supersede the courts’ prior interpretations. The issue that the next Part
addresses is how the Chevron/Brand X framework should apply in the context
of the Supreme Court’s plurality decisions that interpret statutes that agencies
implement.
III. A TYPOLOGY OF SUPREME COURT PLURALITY DECISIONS AND BRAND X’S
APPLICABILITY TO THE AGENCY’S FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE
Not all Supreme Court plurality decisions involve an agency-mediated
statutory scheme. For example, many questions of constitutional requirements
in criminal procedure or questions involving the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or Federal Rules of Evidence involve no agencies whatsoever.
Plurality decisions on these subjects, therefore, do not raise any
Chevron/Brand X issue.
While all Supreme Court plurality decisions implicating an agencymediated statute potentially affect how the agency implements that statute, not
all such decisions create the deference conundrum. Depending on what kind of
issue, precisely, the Supreme Court is addressing, the agency may not have the
option of invoking Brand X in its response. In such situations, federal agencies
are essentially stuck in the same position as lower courts responding to the

159 See Thurmon, supra note 36, at 422 (noting that the problem caused by plurality opinions is lower
courts following higher courts).
160 Indeed, Elizabeth Foote has argued that the entire Chevron framework, by casting what agencies do as
statutory interpretation, was a misstep ab initio. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public
Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV.
673, 674–95 (2007). While this Article pursues the less ambitious task of arguing that post-plurality federal
agencies still have room to maneuver within the Chevron framework, rather than seeking to replace that
framework, it nevertheless concurs with much of Foote’s argument.
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Supreme Court’s plurality decision: they must interpret the Justices’ opinions
in an attempt to discern a controlling legal rationale.
To better illuminate the contours of the deference conundrum and the
potential role of the Chevron/Brand X framework in agency responses to
Supreme Court plurality decisions, this Part presents a typology of five
categories of Supreme Court decisions regarding agency-mediated statutes—
decisions considering the statute’s constitutionality; decisions involving the
implications of a statute beyond the immediate federal regulatory context, as in
federal preemption; decisions assessing the validity of an agency rule or order
on noninterpretive grounds; decisions interpreting an agency-mediated statute
in the absence of an agency interpretation; and decisions assessing the validity
of an existing agency interpretation. For each category, it discusses the
implementing agency’s potential responses to plurality decisions from the
Court.
Importantly, the deference conundrum arises only in the last two categories
of decisions within this typology. Within those two categories, however, the
Chevron/Brand X framework gives agencies the opportunity to avoid the
confusion and uncertainty that often follow from Supreme Court plurality
decisions.
A. Decisions on the Constitutionality of the Statute or the Agency’s
Regulation
As noted, one category of cases that is likely to prompt plurality opinions
in the Supreme Court is constitutional cases—or more specifically for this
Article, decisions on the constitutionality of federal statutes or agency
regulations.161 For example, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,162 the Court issued
a plurality decision regarding the constitutionality of the Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act), which “establishes a mechanism for
funding health care benefits for retirees from the coal industry and their
dependents”163 and is administered by the Commissioner of Social Security.164

161

Corley et al., supra note 27, at 180.
524 U.S. 498 (1998).
163 Id. at 504 (plurality opinion) (citing Pub. L. No. 102-486, 103 Stat. 3036 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. §§ 9701–9722 (2006))).
164 Id. at 514–15.
162
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The plurality of Justice O’Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Thomas relied on the regulatory takings balancing test from Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City to conclude that the Coal Act’s
funding mechanism resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the employer’s
(Eastern Enterprises’) money.165 Given its conclusion on the taking claim, the
plurality did not decide Eastern Enterprises’ substantive due process claim.166
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment that the Coal Act was
unconstitutional, but for entirely different reasons. He concluded that the Coal
Act
must be invalidated as contrary to essential due process principles,
without regard to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I
concur in the judgment holding the Coal Act unconstitutional but
disagree with the plurality’s Takings Clause analysis, which, it is
submitted, is incorrect and quite unnecessary for decision of the
167
case.

Justice Kennedy reached his due process conclusion because the Coal Act’s
funding mechanisms operated retroactively.168
The dissenters, in two opinions, would have declared the Coal Act
constitutional. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, emphasized the historical context of the Coal Act to conclude that
Congress’s solution was constitutional.169 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, essentially agreed with Justice Kennedy that
the takings analysis was incorrect and that the Due Process Clause provided
the proper basis for evaluating the Coal Act, focusing, like Justice Kennedy
did, on the Coal Act’s retroactivity.170 Unlike Justice Kennedy, however,
Justice Breyer concluded that the Coal Act’s retroactivity did not violate
Eastern Enterprises’ due process rights, in large part because of the equities of
Eastern Enterprises’ relationship with its miners.171

165 Id. at 522–23, 529, 532, 537 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
166 Id. at 537–38.
167 Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
168 Id. at 547–50.
169 Id. at 550–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 554–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 558–68.
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Thus, while Eastern Enterprises gave a clear decision that the funding
mechanisms of the Coal Act were unconstitutional, it provided little guidance
to lower courts regarding the proper framework for future evaluations of the
constitutional validity of economic regulation. Lower federal courts have since
struggled with that issue. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, applying Marks,
concluded:
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the plurality in Eastern Enterprises
would not constitute binding authority (i.e., would not constitute the
narrower ground) under any of the several formulations of the Marks
inquiry. We need not decide whether Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
constitutes the narrower ground, because we can assume arguendo
that neither opinion constitutes the narrower ground, thus leaving us
without binding authority, and leaving us with the obligation to
independently evaluate the case law and determine for ourselves
which approach is more consistent with the case law and more
172
plausible.

As a result, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Takings Clause framework for
evaluating the constitutionality of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act
of 2004.173 Other lower federal courts174 and state courts175 have reached
similar conclusions, and even the United States has argued in litigation that
Eastern Enterprises does not constitute binding precedent for evaluating other
statutes.176 Indeed, several lower federal courts have held that Eastern
Enterprises does not even control their decisions regarding other applications
of the Coal Act.177
Nevertheless, while the Marks rule proves unhelpful in identifying a
binding rationale in cases like Eastern Enterprises, post-plurality
implementing federal agencies, like the Social Security Administration, cannot
simply ignore the plurality decision, because federal courts routinely deny
deference to agencies’ views of constitutional matters. This denial of deference
comes in three closely related “flavors,” all of which could limit an agency’s
172

Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1054 (11th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted).
Id. (construing 7 U.S.C. §§ 518–519(c) (2006)).
174 See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Dico, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 536, 541–42 (S.D. Iowa 1999), aff’d, 266 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2001).
175 See Verizon W. Va., Inc. v. W. Va. Bureau of Emp’t Programs, Workers’ Comp. Div., 586 S.E.2d 170,
189–92 (W. Va. 2003).
176 Dico, 189 F.R.D. at 541.
177 See Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1999); Ass’n of
Bituminous Contractors v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Holland v. Pardee Coal Co., 93 F.
Supp. 2d 706, 716 (W.D. Va. 2000), rev’d, 269 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2001).
173
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ability to discount a Supreme Court plurality decision involving constitutional
issues.
First, and most basically, the federal courts have long proclaimed
themselves the primary interpreters of the U.S. Constitution, especially with
respect to the Executive Branch.178 As the D.C. Circuit proclaimed in 1988,
“The federal Judiciary does not . . . owe deference to the Executive Branch’s
interpretation of the Constitution.”179 Second, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that agency interpretations of statutes that themselves push the
boundaries of constitutionality are not entitled to Chevron deference.180 Thus,
if the Supreme Court issued a plurality decision suggesting that the agency’s
prior interpretation of a statute raises constitutional issues, the agency would
have to seriously consider the Justices’ arguments that its interpretation
triggered constitutional concern in order to successfully claim deference in the
next round of judicial review.181 Third, in construing statutes, “the
constitutional avoidance canon of statutory interpretation trumps Chevron
deference.”182 Under this canon, the federal court’s first duty is to find a
constitutional interpretation of the federal statute at issue, and the courts “will
not submit to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if it ‘presents serious
constitutional difficulties.’”183
The canon of constitutional avoidance also has implications for any Brand
X analysis because federal courts are likely to accord greater precedential
weight to prior judicial interpretations of a statute that were based on that
canon—in Brand X’s terms, to regard those prior court decisions as decisively
resolving statutory ambiguities. Two decisions from the federal courts of
appeals, one before the Brand X decision and one after, illustrate this point. In

178

See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704–05 (1974); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177–78 (1803); Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
179 Pub. Citizen v. Burke, 843 F.2d 1473, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
180 Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–73 (2001).
181 See, e.g., In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to accord Chevron deference
to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act because the agency’s regulations
raised constitutional issues).
182 Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1340–41 (D.C. Cir. 2002); accord Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v.
Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1249 (10th
Cir. 2008); Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2007); Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150,
1162–63 (9th Cir. 2004).
183 Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 512 F.3d at 711 (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 605 (D.C.
Cir. 1995)).
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University of Great Falls v. NLRB,184 the D.C. Circuit in 2002 refused to defer
to the NLRB’s interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act185 (NLRA)
as applied to the University of Great Falls, which claimed the exemption for
religious institutions that the Supreme Court had established in NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago.186 According to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the NLRA was based on constitutional avoidance and,
as a result, the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA with respect to the
University of Great Falls was not entitled to deference.187
In 2007, post-Brand X, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion
about its own constitutional avoidance precedent in Blake v. Carbone.188 In
1976, the Second Circuit had construed specific provisions of the INA to avoid
Equal Protection Clause infirmities.189 When the Immigration and
Naturalization Service later tried to reinterpret those same provisions in ways
that recreated the equal protection problems, the Second Circuit accorded no
deference to the agency’s interpretation, emphasizing its own duty to interpret
the statute to avoid constitutional problems.190
Thus, the canon of constitutional avoidance severely attenuates the
potential roles of both Chevron deference and the Brand X rule. In conjunction
with the courts’ unwillingness to defer to an agency’s constitutional analysis or
to agency interpretations of statutes that push constitutional boundaries,
agencies coping with Supreme Court plurality decisions based on
constitutional issues have few practical options other than to engage in their
own Marks-rule analyses. The lesson for federal agencies dealing with
plurality decisions in this category is thus stark: such agencies must cope as
best they can—most likely, conservatively—with the constitutional concerns
of the plurality Justices.

184

278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2006).
186 Univ. of Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1341 (citing 440 U.S. 490, 499 (1979)).
187 Id. First, the NLRB was, in effect, an agency interpreting a court, not an agency interpreting a statute:
“The application of Catholic Bishop to the facts of this case is thus an interpretation of precedent, rather than a
statute, and for the court an occasion calling for the exercise of constitutional avoidance.” Id. Second,
deference to the NLRB was especially unwarranted “where, as here, the Supreme Court precedent, and
subsequent interpretation, is based on constitutional concerns, an area of presumed judicial, rather than
administrative, competence.” Id.
188 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
189 Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272–73 (2d Cir. 1976).
190 Blake, 489 F.3d at 100.
185
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B. Decisions Invoking Statutory Interpretation for Purposes Beyond the
Direct Regulatory Application of the Statute
Most agency-mediated statutes are regulatory in character, and the federal
agency’s primary function under the statute is to implement a regulatory
program. Nevertheless, federal courts often interpret federal statutes for
purposes other than resolving issues regarding federal implementation of the
regulatory program. One of the most prominent of these extraregulatory (at
least from the perspective of the federal agency implementing the statute)
statutory construction issues is federal preemption.
Federal preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause, which states that the
laws of the United States, including the Federal Constitution, federal statutes,
and treaties, “shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . , any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”191 Unlike
many provisions of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause is not a basis for
declaring a federal statute unconstitutional; indeed, the Clause’s effect, if
anything, is to reinforce the federal law. Instead, federal preemption analyses
are concerned primarily with whether states can regulate in the same
substantive sphere as the federal statute192 and whether the federal statute
displaces state tort liability.193 Thus, when the Supreme Court issues a plurality
decision regarding the preemptive effect of a federal statute, the entities left
without clear legal guidance are state regulatory agencies and actual and
potential tort victims. While important, these questions have little bearing on
how the relevant federal agency chooses to implement the statute with respect

191

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,
485 U.S. 293, 300–04 (1988); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
193 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (2009); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431,
434 (2005); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517–31 (1992).
192
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to federally regulated entities.194 Deference to the implementing federal agency
is not the relevant issue,195 and the deference conundrum does not arise.
Consider, for example, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which raised the
question of whether federally mandated warning labels on cigarettes preempted
state-law tort claims against cigarette manufacturers.196 The Court split three
ways, leaving the preemptive effect of the cigarette statutes and, more
importantly, the process of preemption analysis in considerable doubt.
A majority of Justices concluded that the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act197 (1965 Act) did not preempt state law tort claims.198
Section 5 of that act addressed preemption and stated:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by section 4 of this Act [“Caution: Cigarette
Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health”], shall be required on
any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in
the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
199
conformity with the provisions of this Act.

Justice Stevens, writing for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White,
and Justice O’Connor, concluded that “on their face, these provisions merely
prohibited state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular
cautionary statements on cigarette labels (§ 5(a)) or in cigarette advertisements
(§ 5(b))” and that “there is no general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state

194 If the implementing federal agency attempts to preempt state law through regulations, the interpretive
and deference issues become intermixed. This intermixing raises provocative questions regarding federal
agency authority that have not yet been fully resolved. However, the Chevron questions that arise do not differ
significantly from questions that have arisen in other contexts regarding an agency’s authority to regulate when
it claims deference. For recent scholarship exploring the issue of agency preemption, see generally Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle, or Creeping to Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REV.
197 (2009); William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 1233 (2010); and Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Preemption of State Common Law by Federal
Agency Action: Striking the Appropriate Balance that Protects Public Safety, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1203 (2010).
195 See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1996) (emphasizing that the questions of
whether a federal statute preempts state law and whether an agency’s interpretation of the same statute should
be given deference are separate).
196 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992).
197 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2006)).
198 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519–20.
199 § 5(a)–(b), 79 Stat. at 283.
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common-law damages actions.”200 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
Kennedy and Justice Souter, concurred in Stevens’s conclusion because “[t]he
narrow scope of federal pre-emption is . . . apparent from the statutory text,
and it is correspondingly impossible to divine any ‘clear and manifest purpose’
on the part of Congress to pre-empt common-law damages actions.”201 In
contrast, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that the 1965 Act
preempted failure-to-warn claims202 because of the 1965 Act’s general
prohibition on “statements” relating to smoking and health.203
Congress changed the relevant preemption provisions when it enacted the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (1969 Act), amending
section 5(b) to read: “No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this Act.”204 According to Justice Stevens’ plurality,
“[T]he plain language of the pre-emption provision in the 1969 Act is much
broader.”205 However, the plurality analyzed the plaintiff’s tort claims claim by
claim using what has become known as the “predicate-duty approach”206 and
concluded that (1) the 1969 Act created the only relevant duty regarding
warnings and thus preempted failure-to-warn claims against cigarette
manufacturers that allege that the manufacturers should have provided
additional warnings;207 (2) the 1969 Act did not create duties regarding the
companies’ testing or research practices and thus did not preempt failure-towarn claims based solely on those activities;208 (3) the 1969 Act did not govern
duties regarding promises in advertising and thus did not preempt breach-ofexpress-warranty claims;209 (4) the 1969 Act did not preempt fraudulent
misrepresentation claims for similar reasons;210 and (5) the 1969 Act did not
preempt conspiracy claims because those were unrelated to safety

200

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
202 Id. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
203 Id. at 549–50.
204 Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341
(2006)).
205 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion).
206 Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 552 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524 (plurality opinion).
208 Id. at 524–25.
209 Id. at 525–27.
210 Id. at 527–29.
201
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regulation.211 Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter found “the plurality’s
conclusion that the 1969 Act pre-empts at least some common-law damages
claims little short of baffling,” because the 1969 amendment “no more
‘clearly’ or ‘manifestly’ exhibits an intent to pre-empt state common-law
damages actions than did the language of its predecessor in the 1965 Act.”212
In contrast, Justices Scalia and Thomas found that the 1969 Act preempted all
of the common law claims.213
To a certain extent, therefore, Cipollone did provide states and potential
tort plaintiffs with real answers: the 1965 Act does not preempt any state law
tort claims (7–2), and the 1969 Act preempts state law failure-to-warn claims
(6–3), but it does not preempt four other kinds of damages claims (7–2).
However, the fractured nature of the opinion and, in particular, the fact that
only a plurality supported the predicate-duty approach to preemption analysis,
provided little guidance to lower courts deciding whether the 1965 or 1969
Acts preempted other kinds of state law claims. Indeed, the lower courts split
regarding whether the 1969 Act preempted tort claims based on alleged
manufacturer fraud regarding the safety of “light” cigarettes. The Fifth Circuit
analogized such claims to “warning neutralization” claims and held that the
1969 Act, as construed in Cipollone, preempted them.214 In contrast, the First
Circuit analogized the claims to fraud claims and held that, under Cipollone,
they were not preempted.215 Granting certiorari to review the First Circuit’s
decision, a 5–4 Supreme Court adopted the Cipollone plurality’s predicateduty approach and agreed with the First Circuit that the 1969 Act did not
preempt the claim.216 The Court reached this holding even over the dissent’s
objection that a majority of Justices in Cipollone had rejected that approach.217
Nevertheless, a decade and a half of uncertainty over how to analyze the
cigarette warning’s preemption of state tort law had little impact on the Food
and Drug Administration’s regulation of cigarette warnings,218 demonstrating

211

Id. at 530.
Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
213 Id. at 544, 551–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
214 Brown v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 479 F.3d 383, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2007).
215 Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 37, 40–43 (1st Cir. 2007), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
216 Good, 129 S. Ct. at 545–46.
217 Id. at 552 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
218 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,544 (Aug. 28, 1996). This regulation was later invalidated
for lack of authority. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–26, 142–43, 159–60
(2000).
212

CRAIG GALLEYSFINAL

38

11/1/2011 12:56 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1

that the deference conundrum is unlikely to arise for this category of Supreme
Court opinions. Even if it did, the Supreme Court has suggested—consistent
with the federal courts’ view of their primacy in constitutional interpretation in
general—that it would be unwilling to defer to an agency’s view of a statute’s
preemptive effect,219 even though the Court will accord “some weight”—
recently identified as Skidmore deference—to an agency’s view of whether
state law conflicts with an agency regulation having the force of law.220
C. Decisions Regarding the Validity of Noninterpretive Agency Action
The Chevron/Mead/Skidmore deference framework applies only to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute that it implements, but the Federal APA
supplies courts with a variety of reasons for overturning agency action.221 The
deference conundrum does not arise from—and Brand X affords an agency no
additional options for responding to—Supreme Court plurality decisions that
evaluate agency actions on these other grounds, such as procedural compliance
or evidentiary support.
For example, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Supreme Court
splintered badly regarding the legitimacy of the FCC’s attempts to prosecute
Fox Television for two violations of the FCC’s indecency restrictions for
public broadcasts, through which the FCC implements the Communications
Act.222 While the FCC’s implementation of this prohibition was originally
limited to the use of sexual or scatological terms for their literal meanings, in
2004 it indicated for the first time that nonliteral (or explicative) use of the
prohibited words could also be actionable.223 The FCC cited Fox Television for
broadcasting Cher’s use of forbidden expletives during the 2002 Billboard
Music Awards and for broadcasting Nicole Richie’s use of forbidden
expletives during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards.224

219 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) (“[A]gencies have no special authority to
pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress . . . .”); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S.
1, 20–21 (2007) (discounting an agency regulation and determining for itself whether a statute preempted state
law); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (“We may assume (without deciding) that
the . . . question [of whether a statute is preemptive] must always be decided de novo by the courts.”).
220 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
221 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
222 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1806 (2009) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) and Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat.
1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615b (2006))).
223 Id. at 1807.
224 Id. at 1808.
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The issues for the Supreme Court were (1) whether the FCC had properly
followed the APA’s procedures in issuing its orders against Fox Television; (2)
whether the FCC’s application of the indecency rules to the broadcasts was
arbitrary and capricious under the APA; and, in the background of the case, (3)
whether the FCC’s orders violated the First Amendment.225 However, the
plurality nature of the decision—in essence, a 4–1–4 split—arose from how the
various Justices’ opinions framed the proper scope of arbitrary-and-capricious
review when a federal agency changes its policy on how to implement a
statute.
The Court first held, 5–4, that the FCC changing its position on what
constituted a violation of the indecency prohibitions did not warrant more
stringent review under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard.226 Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and,
nominally at least, Justice Kennedy, thus purported to apply the usual
arbitrary-and-capricious analysis. Nevertheless, in the context of an agency’s
changed policy, they also emphasized, “To be sure, the requirement that an
agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand
that it display awareness that it is changing position. An agency may not, for
example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that
are still on the books.”227
A majority of Justices concluded that the FCC’s implementation was not
arbitrary and capricious. Justice Scalia’s opinion upheld the FCC largely
because “[i]t was certainly reasonable to determine that it made no sense to
distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words” and because
technological advances made it much easier for broadcasters to “bleep” out any
offending uses of prohibited words.228
Justice Kennedy complicated what could have been a clear majority
approach. Although concurring in the judgment and nominally concurring in
Justice Scalia’s opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote separately to establish a new
standard for arbitrary-and-capricious review in the context of changed
policies—a standard that differed markedly from Justice Scalia’s.229 In
essence, Justice Kennedy eschewed a one-size-fits-all analysis for a more

225
226
227
228
229

Id. at 1810–12.
Id. at 1810–11.
Id. at 1811.
Id. at 1812–13.
Id. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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nuanced approach to arbitrary-and-capricious review that depends on the
agency’s exact circumstances and motivations for changing policy.230
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
insisted that agencies changing policies must explain, in a meaningful way
relative to the initial decision, not just why the new policy was rational but also
why exactly the agency had decided to change policies.231 Because the FCC
did not sufficiently explain the reasons for its change in policy, the dissenters
declared its orders against Fox Television arbitrary and capricious.232
Fox Television thus leaves federal courts with multiple rules for how to
approach arbitrary-and-capricious review when a federal agency changes
policy, especially because Justice Kennedy’s view of that standard aligns more
readily with the four dissenters’ than the majority’s, despite his concurrence in
the judgment. Nevertheless, the decision does not trigger the deference
conundrum for two reasons. First, no federal agency is authorized to interpret
the APA itself. Second, agency decisions subject to arbitrary-and-capricious
review are, almost by definition, not subject to Chevron deference, and hence
the Brand X rule is not relevant.233 The same would be true in the aftermath of
Supreme Court plurality decisions regarding whether the agency had correctly
followed the APA’s procedures234 or whether the agency’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence.235 In such circumstances, post-plurality
agencies must do their best to interpret the Justices’ rationales and to try to
correct the deficiencies that at least some Justices discerned.
230

Id. at 1822–23. Justice Kennedy stated:
The question whether a change in policy requires an agency to provide a more-reasoned
explanation than when the original policy was first announced is not susceptible, in my view, to
an answer that applies in all cases. . . .
The question in each case is whether the agency’s reasons for the change, when viewed in
light of the data available to it, and when informed by the experience and expertise of the agency,
suffice to demonstrate that the new policy rests upon principles that are rational, neutral, and in
accord with the agency’s proper understanding of its authority.

Id.
231

Id. at 1829–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1829.
233 See Garcia v. Shanahan, 615 F. Supp. 2d 175, 185–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[B]ecause the instant case is
one calling only for statutory interpretation, . . . the Court does not find . . . the Fox Television decision to
affect the outcome in this case.”).
234 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (setting out procedures for informal rulemaking); id. §§ 554, 556–557
(setting out procedures for formal rulemaking and adjudication); id. § 706(2)(D) (allowing the federal courts to
set aside agency action when the agency did not follow the correct procedures).
235 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (establishing the “substantial evidence” standard of review).
232
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D. Decisions Engaging in Statutory Interpretation in the Absence of an
Agency Interpretation
In the prototypical Brand X situation, a court has interpreted a statute that
an agency implements, in the absence of an existing agency regulation, and
then the agency wants to interpret the statute differently than the court did. In
fact, the question in Brand X itself was whether the Ninth Circuit was correct
to follow its own precedent in interpreting the Communications Act or whether
it should have accorded Chevron deference to the FCC’s interpretation.236 The
Brand X majority clearly subordinated court interpretations to agency
interpretations in this situation, concluding, as discussed, that “[a] court’s prior
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves
no room for agency discretion.”237
Brand X left at least two questions regarding its scope. First, because the
case dealt with Chevron deference and later agency interpretations that were
clearly “otherwise entitled to Chevron deference,”238 it provides little guidance
regarding how courts should treat existing court precedent when later and
contrary agency interpretations are not entitled to Chevron deference.
Nevertheless, lower courts have found or implied that the Brand X rule applies
only to agency interpretations that otherwise are entitled to Chevron
deference,239 which is consistent with the special status of Chevron deference.
Chevron deference respects Congress’s decision to invest interpretive authority
in agencies rather than courts—so long as the agency deliberatively exercises
delegated lawmaking authority. As the Brand X majority emphasized, if the
two analytical steps are met, “Chevron requires a federal court to accept the
agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from
what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”240 In contrast,
lesser standards of deference do not demand that a court give up its prerogative
236

Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 979–83 (2005).
Id. at 982.
238 Id.
239 See, e.g., Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1303, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (refusing
to apply the Brand X rule to an interpretation that warranted only Skidmore deference); White & Case LLP v.
United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 12, 22 (2009) (“To the extent that the term ‘case’ was construed by the Court of
Claims in Cornman, however, this holding and related determinations continue to bind our Court—until the
agency changes its construction of the statute in a manner garnering Chevron deference.”).
240 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 990 (2005) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843–44 & n.11 (1984)).
237
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to discern the “best” interpretation of a statute. For example, under Skidmore
deference, an agency interpretation receives deference only to the extent that it
has the “power to persuade.”241
Second, as noted in Part I, the Justices disagree as to whether the Brand X
rule encompasses the Supreme Court’s own interpretations of statutes. There is
nothing in the majority’s rule that would exclude Supreme Court decisions,
and scholarship has argued that Supreme Court interpretations should be
included within the scope of the Brand X rule.242 Conversely, as noted, Justice
Stevens concurred specifically in Brand X to indicate that Supreme Court
decisions do resolve statutory ambiguities, precluding application of the Brand
X rule.243 Scholars, too, have displayed some queasiness regarding the
implications of applying the Brand X rule to the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of statutes,244 and the Supreme Court has failed to apply Brand
X to its own decisions, although usually not with explanation.245
Nevertheless, any squeamishness about applying the Brand X rule to
constructions of statutes endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court Justices
should dissipate in the context of plurality decisions that offer no majority
interpretation. Moreover, Brand X should apply to Supreme Court plurality
decisions that interpret a statute that a federal agency implements even if the
Marks rule could easily provide a controlling rationale.
To begin, of course, not all—and perhaps very few—Supreme Court
plurality decisions even fit the Marks-rule structure. For example, in the most
extreme version of a plurality decision, an equally divided Court issues no
opinion. Thus, in Borden Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the CWA’s prohibition of
“discharge[s] of any pollutant” into the nation’s waters to extend to “deep
ripping” wetlands, a procedure “in which four- to seven-foot long metal prongs
241

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
See Richard Murphy, The Brand X Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1247, 1250–52; Doug Geyser,
Note, Courts Still “Say What the Law Is”: Explaining the Functions of the Judiciary and Agencies After Brand
X, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2129, 2131 n.13 (2006).
243 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring).
244 See Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997,
1015–16, 1023 (2007); Note, Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step One Holding, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1532, 1533 (2006); Darren H. Weiss, Note, X Misses the Spot: Fernandez v. Keisler and the
(Mis)Appopriation of Brand X by the Board of Immigration Appeals, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889, 893, 908–
09 (2010).
245 See Robin Kundis Craig, Administrative Law in the Roberts Court: The First Four Years, 62 ADMIN.
L. REV. 69, 172–86 (2010).
242
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are dragged through the soil behind a tractor or a bulldozer,” destroying the
confining bottom layer of the wetland and allowing the wetland to drain.246
While this interpretation is questionable, the Ninth Circuit did not defer to any
interpretation by the U.S. Army Corps or the EPA to reach it, instead relying
solely on statutory definitions and prior case law.247 The Supreme Court,
however, failed to provide any guidance regarding the correctness of the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation or the validity of its reasoning. Instead, the entirety of
the Court’s opinion was as follows: “The judgment is affirmed by an equally
divided Court. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.”248
In this extreme situation, it is difficult to conclude that the Supreme Court
has issued any interpretation of the statute; instead, it has merely applied its
default rule that 4–4 splits among the Justices affirm the lower court.249 Indeed,
the Court itself has noted that a 4–4 “judgment amounts at best to nothing
more than an unexplained affirmance by an equally divided court—a judgment
not entitled to precedential weight no matter what reasoning may have
supported it.”250 As a result, if the Army Corps and the EPA wanted to
promulgate a regulation, using full notice-and-comment rulemaking, that
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation—and if it concluded that the
CWA does not extend to deep ripping—Brand X should apply to that
regulation. In other words, the regulation should receive Chevron deference,
despite the Supreme Court’s nominal affirmance of the lower court’s view.
Even in Supreme Court plurality decisions with substantial opinions, it
cannot always be said that the Court has actually and definitively interpreted
the statute at issue. Even if Justice Stevens’s caveat to Brand X is assumed to
be part of the Brand X rule, that caveat presumes that the Supreme Court’s
decision “remove[s] any pre-existing ambiguity.”251 In contrast, interpretations

246 Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 812–15 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (construing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006)), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided
court, 537 U.S. 99 (2002).
247 Id. at 814–15.
248 Borden Ranch, 537 U.S. at 100.
249 See Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 113 (1868) (noting the default rule but clarifying that
the actual decision is binding on the parties involved); Hemmenway v. Fisher, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 255, 260
(1857) (noting the default rule); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006) (applying the default rule to cases where the
Supreme Court does not have a quorum).
250 Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 304 (1996).
251 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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of statutes in plurality decisions tend to underscore, rather than remove,
statutory ambiguities. As John Davis and William Reynolds observed, “[A]
plurality opinion is not, strictly speaking, an opinion of the Court as an
institution; it represents nothing more than the views of the individual justices
who join in the opinion.”252 As a result, “[A] plurality opinion often fails to
give definitive guidance as to the state of the law to lower courts—both state
and federal—as well as to the legislative, administrative, and executive
agencies charged with implementing the standards so ambivalently articulated
by the Court.”253
For example, in Lukhard v. Reed, the Supreme Court split 4–1–4 regarding
whether states could legitimately interpret “income” to include personal injury
awards for purposes of determining the eligibility of families seeking Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).254 At the federal level, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) implements this program,
but the structure of the program leaves states with considerable discretion to
interpret details. In the wake of 1981 legislation amending the program, for
example, the Secretary of HHS “advised the States to adhere to their existing
definitions of income.”255
After the case was filed, the Secretary of HHS promulgated a regulation
that required states to treat lump-sum awards as income.256 Nevertheless, the
four-Justice plurality (Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White,
and Justice Stevens) declined to decide the case on the basis of that
regulation,257 engaging instead in straightforward statutory interpretation to
determine whether the State of Virginia’s regulation regarding the treatment of
income was legitimate.258 The plurality rather weakly upheld Virginia’s
decision to treat personal injury awards as income, concluding not that the
federal statutes clearly supported that interpretation but rather only that
“[r]espondents have not demonstrated that Virginia’s policy of treating

252

Davis & Reynolds, supra note 137, at 61.
Id. at 62.
254 481 U.S. 368 (1987) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). AFDC was replaced by
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families in 1996. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 492–93 (1999).
255 Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 385 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 47
Fed. Reg. 5648, 5656 (Feb. 5, 1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 205–206, 232–235, 238–239)).
256 Id. at 379 n.5 (plurality opinion) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1986) and Aid to Families
with Dependent Children Adult Assistance Programs, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,558, 45,568 (proposed Nov. 16, 1984)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 201, 205–206, 225, 232–235, 237)).
257 Id.
258 Id.
253
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personal injury awards as income is inconsistent with the AFDC statute or
HHS’ regulations.”259
Justice Powell dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
O’Connor. Looking at federal treatment of personal injury awards, they
concluded that, “[i]n a variety of circumstances, Congress has recognized that
injured persons and their families should be permitted to retain the full amount
of [tort and workers’ compensation] awards,” and hence that “[i]t is unjust, and
inconsistent with the basic purposes of the AFDC statute, to deny needy
families the compensation our legal system affords to the rest of society.”260
That left Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the plurality’s decision to
reverse the lower court but nothing else. His opinion, in its entirety, was as
follows:
I join the judgment of the Court but not the opinion of the
plurality, for I would base my vote to reverse not on an endorsement
of the original Virginia interpretation but, flatly, on the deference that
is due the Secretary of Health and Human Services in his
interpretation of the governing statutes. In a statutory area as
complicated as this one, the administrative authorities are far more
able than this Court to determine congressional intent in the light of
experience in the field. If the result is unacceptable to Congress, it
has only to clarify the situation with language that unambiguously
261
specifies its intent.

Thus, Justice Blackmun not only refused to join the plurality’s reasoning but
also explicitly invoked deference to federal agencies as the preferred
alternative approach.
Lukhard, a 1987 decision, preceded Brand X by almost two decades.
Moreover, the Secretary’s regulation treating personal injury awards as income
remains in place.262 Nevertheless, as an intellectual exercise, it remains
worthwhile to ask whether Lukhard in any way foreclosed HHS’s ability to
interpret the federal statutes to reach the opposite conclusion—that states
cannot consider personal injury awards to be income for purposes of the
AFDC program.

259
260
261
262

Id. at 383.
Id. at 391–92 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 383–84 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (2011).
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The most intellectually honest conclusion is that the plurality decision had
no such preclusive effect. Indeed, the very existence of the plurality opinions
undermines any conclusion that the Supreme Court interpreted the AFDC
statutes to remove all ambiguity regarding the scope of “income.” The four
dissenting Justices clearly thought that the alternative interpretation (personal
injury awards are not income) was the better one, and Justice Blackmun would
have preferred to decide the case based on deference to the HHS. Under the
Marks rule, there is no narrowest grounds rationale to support the majority
decision. Moreover, as a pragmatic matter, the concurrence and the dissent
together suggest that five Justices would have deferred to (and upheld) the
HHS’s interpretation if it had promulgated a regulation embodying the
dissent’s interpretation.
In addition, the plurality opinion itself offers no definitive interpretation of
the statute. The plurality was not trying to determine what the Federal AFDC
statutes absolutely require but rather whether Virginia’s policy was consistent
with them. Thus, for example, the plurality concluded, after reviewing
dictionary definitions, that “Virginia’s revised regulations are consistent with a
perfectly natural use of ‘income’”263—but it also acknowledged that federal
law had treated personal injury awards differently.264 Similarly, it concluded
that “personal injury awards are almost entirely a gain in well-being, as wellbeing is measured under the AFDC statute, and can reasonably be treated as
income”265—not that they must or even should be treated as such. The
complexity of the issue also contributed to the reasonableness of Virginia’s
policy and simultaneously suggested that other views might be equally
reasonable: “Compensating for the noneconomic inequities of life is a task
daunting in its complexity, and the AFDC statute is neither designed nor
interpreted unreasonably if it leaves them untouched.”266 Finally, upholding
Virginia’s policy accorded the state “solicitude” in a federalist system267—but
that consideration has little bearing on whether the plurality was definitively
construing the federal statutes.
Thus, in a Brand X world, the HHS—and any federal agency reviewing its
regulations or orders after a Supreme Court plurality decision relevant to a
statute that the agency implements—should be able to claim Chevron
263
264
265
266
267

Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 376 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 376–77.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 382–83.
Id. at 383.
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deference for any post-plurality agency interpretation that would otherwise be
entitled to Chevron deference. Even if Justice Stevens’s caveat is considered
part of the Brand X rule, the Supreme Court plurality decision here did not
remove the ambiguity because it did not offer a definitive interpretation of the
statute.
But what if the Supreme Court issues a plurality opinion where the Marks
rule could easily apply—where the various interpretations of the statute
represent broadening viewpoints? Should the courts apply Marks to eliminate
the agency’s Brand X authority to reinterpret, or should Brand X trump Marks?
Even assuming that Justice Stevens’s concurrence is part of the Brand X rule,
reasonable minds could differ on this point, but the better argument is that
Brand X should trump Marks. First, to the extent that the Supreme Court’s
constitutional role is “to say what the law is,”268 any plurality decision
represents an abdication of that role.269 As a normative matter, therefore, it is
difficult to articulate why, under Brand X, federal agencies can displace the
majoritarian—or even unanimous—interpretation of a federal court of appeals
but not the plurality interpretation of four or fewer Justices.
Second, as a practical matter, a Marks-amenable plurality decision
interpreting a statute would most likely consist of a series of progressively
more expansive views of what a statutory term encompasses. An application of
Marks could thus constrain agency policymaking discretion in ways that
violate the spirit of Chevron. For example, assume that application of a statute
that a federal agency implements depends on the meaning of a given term
within the statute. At the Supreme Court, all nine Justices agree that the term
includes A, but one concludes that it includes only A; three conclude that it
includes A and B; one concludes that the term includes A, B, and C; two
conclude that it includes A and D; and two conclude that it includes A, D, and
E. The Supreme Court has failed to proffer an exact definition of the critical
term, but heavy-handed application of Marks in this situation would limit the
statutory regime to A, even though eight Justices believed that the statute
should apply more broadly. Brand X, in contrast, would allow the
implementing agency to determine just how broadly the statutory regime
should apply as a matter of policy—a result more clearly in line with the
principles of Chevron than the Marks rule.

268

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Berkolow, supra note 17, at 301; Bloom, supra note 27, at 1373, 1378–79; Kimura, supra note 26, at
1625; Ledebur, supra note 18, at 919; Note, supra note 27, at 1127–28.
269
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This discussion can be summarized into the Chevron two-step analysis as
follows. First, at Chevron Step One, no Supreme Court plurality opinion
definitively removes all statutory ambiguity. Even when the Marks rule
applies, the decision will not completely circumscribe the meaning of the
statute at issue. Second, at Chevron Step Two, most Supreme Court plurality
decisions will not even provide definitive guidance regarding the
reasonableness of various interpretations, either because the Supreme Court
offers no opinion at all or because the Justices’ opinions are mutually
contradictory. For certain plurality opinions, however, the Marks rule might
elucidate the potential bounds of agency interpretive reasonableness. For
example, in the hypothetical in the previous paragraph, operation of the Marks
logic indicates that the agency would have a difficult time interpreting the
relevant statutory term to not include A.
Nevertheless, in a Brand X world, plurality decisions in this category leave
the agencies much latitude to continue to interpret the statutes that they
implement. However, given the existence of judicial precedent in this situation
(the lower courts’ decisions, if not the Supreme Court’s plurality decision) and
the probable inapplicability of the Brand X rule outside the realm of Chevron
deference, agencies are well-advised to issue post-plurality interpretations
through procedures that would entitle the interpretation to Chevron deference.
E. Decisions Regarding the Validity of the Implementing Agency’s
Interpretation of the Statute
In the last category of this typology, the Supreme Court issues a plurality
decision regarding the legitimacy of an existing agency interpretation of a
statute. To assess the validity of the agency’s interpretation, the Court must
necessarily engage in its own construction of the statute, such as in Chevron’s
Step One. As such, this category of plurality opinions raises all of the Brand X
considerations that the previous category did, and the Justices’ plurality
interpretations are again unlikely to definitively remove all statutory
ambiguity. However, because the Justices are also evaluating an existing
agency interpretation, their plurality opinions are more likely to constrain the
agency’s post-decision reinterpretation of the statute than when the Court
engages in unmediated statutory interpretation.
The Federal CWA’s application to “navigable waters” has long raised
complex issues of statutory interpretation, resulting in the Supreme Court’s
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plurality decision in Rapanos v. United States in June 2006.270 Some statutory
background is necessary to give context to the deference conundrum that the
Army Corps and EPA now face in the aftermath of this decision. Moreover,
because Rapanos is the basis for this Article’s case study in Part IV, I present
that decision in some detail here.
The CWA forbids “the discharge of any pollutant by any person” except as
in compliance with the CWA, which generally requires that a discharger obtain
a permit.271 The CWA further defines “discharge of a pollutant” and
“discharge of pollutants” to be “any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source,”272 with “navigable waters” being “the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas.”273
The two agencies that implement the CWA—the EPA274 and the Army
Corps275—issued identical notice-and-comment regulations broadly defining
“waters of the United States.” These regulations have been in place, virtually
unchanged, since 1982.276
The Supreme Court has addressed the validity of these regulations three
times, the last of which was in Rapanos. In its first decision in 1985, United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court had to decide whether to uphold
the Army Corps’ decision (and, by implication, the EPA’s parallel decision) to
include wetlands adjacent to a larger body of water within the scope of the
CWA’s “waters of the United States.”277 In its unanimous decision, the Court
upheld the regulatory definition, reasoning that protection of aquatic
ecosystems demanded broad federal authority to control pollution because
“[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of
pollutants be controlled at the source.”278 The Court accorded the regulation

270

547 U.S. 715 (2006).
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
272 Id. § 1362(12).
273 Id. § 1362(7). The CWA broadly defines “pollutant” to include almost any waste added to water. Id.
§ 1362(6). A “point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,” such as a pipe or ditch. Id.
§ 1362(14). A “person” is “an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality,
commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.” Id. § 1362(5).
274 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2010).
275 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2010).
276 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985).
277 Id.
278 Id. at 132–33 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1971)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
271
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Chevron deference279 and upheld the agencies’ interpretation as reasonable,
concluding that “the evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of
water quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the
Corps to interpret the term ‘waters’ to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters
as more conventionally defined.”280
It was slightly more than fifteen years before the Supreme Court again
addressed the agencies’ regulations defining “waters of the United States” in
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANCC).281 This case resulted in a 5–4 decision on the validity of
the Army Corps’ “Migratory Bird Rule.”282 In 1986, in an attempt to clarify its
definition of “waters of the United States,” the Army Corps published a
nonregulatory explanation of its regulations. Under this explanation, the Army
Corps noted that it would assert CWA jurisdiction over intrastate waters that
“are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird
Treaties”; that “are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which
cross state lines”; that “are or would be used as habitat for endangered
species”; or that are “[u]sed to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.”283
The Migratory Bird Rule thus clearly contemplated federal regulation of
waters that had no immediate connection to larger waters of the United States,
which became the key issue in SWANCC.
In SWANCC, the Army Corps had relied on migratory birds’ use of filling
ponds in an abandoned sand and gravel pit to conclude that the Solid Waste
Agency needed a CWA permit before filling those ponds, despite the fact that
the ponds had no apparent connection to other larger waters.284 When the
Army Corps refused to issue a permit, the Solid Waste Agency challenged the
denial, arguing that the filling ponds were outside the Army Corps’ CWA
jurisdiction.285 A majority of the Supreme Court agreed, concluding most
explicitly “that the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ is not fairly supported by the
CWA.”286 However, the SWANCC Court also indicated interpretive limitations

279
280
281
282
283

Id. at 131.
Id. at 133.
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
Id. at 162, 164.
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13,

1986).
284
285
286

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164–65.
Id.
Id. at 167.
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beyond the Migratory Bird Rule itself.287 According to the majority, “It was
the significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.”288 As a
result, the majority strongly suggested that the CWA’s scope did not extend to
isolated wetlands and ponds because Congress’s use of “navigable waters” in
the statute “has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as
its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that
were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”289
Moreover, the Court refused to defer to the Army Corps’ more expansive view
of CWA jurisdiction because that interpretation “alters the federal-state
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power,”
raising constitutional concerns.290
Thus, going into the Rapanos decision, the Supreme Court had
unanimously deferred to the agencies’ conclusion that CWA “navigable
waters” included wetlands adjacent to larger waters, but refused to accord
deference and effectively invalidated the agencies’ extension of “navigable
waters” to isolated, intrastate waters, citing federalism concerns. Rapanos
raised the interim issue: can CWA “navigable waters” or “waters of the United
States,” as the agencies had concluded by regulation, include wetlands adjacent
to smaller tributaries of traditional navigable waters?291
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos did little to clarify the exact
scope of CWA “waters of the United States,” producing a 4–1–4 split among
the Justices and five opinions. Justice Scalia authored the plurality opinion,
which focused on the plain meaning of “the waters of the United States” to
conclude that the CWA extends only “to water ‘[a]s found in streams and
bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes’ or
‘the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams
or bodies.’”292 As a result, according to the plurality, jurisdiction under the
CWA exists only for “those relatively permanent, standing or continuously
287

Id.
Id.
289 Id. at 172 (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407–08 (1940)).
290 Id. at 173. “Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within
the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary
power over land and water use.” Id. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44
(1994)).
291 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006) (plurality opinion).
292 Id. at 732–33 (alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882
(2d ed. 1954) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S]).
288
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flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in
ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’”293 As for
wetlands, “[O]nly those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to
bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, so that there is
no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands, are ‘adjacent to’ such
waters and covered by the [CWA].”294
The plurality also emphasized that its interpretation was the “only plausible
interpretation” of “waters of the United States.”295 Thus, the plurality
suggested that it was consciously foreclosing the application of Brand X to
future agency interpretations.296
Chief Justice Roberts, who joined the plurality, authored his own opinion to
speak more directly to the issue of deference and the agencies’ prerogatives.
According to Chief Justice Roberts, “Agencies delegated rulemaking authority
under a statute such as the Clean Water Act are afforded generous leeway by
the courts in interpreting the statute they are entrusted to administer.”297
However:
Rather than refining its view of its authority in light of our decision in
SWANCC, and providing guidance meriting deference under our
generous standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially
boundless view of the scope of its power. The upshot today is another
298
defeat for the agency.

Chief Justice Roberts also anticipated that “[l]ower courts and regulated
entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis,” citing a
discussion of Marks and implying that the agencies were no longer directly
relevant to the interpretation of “waters of the United States.”299 Almost all of

293

Id. at 739 (alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S, supra note 292, at 2882).
Id. at 742.
295 Id. at 739.
296 See Helen Thigpen, Note, The Plurality Paradox: Rapanos v. U.S. and the Uncertain Future of
Federal Wetlands Protection, 28 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 89, 107 (2007) (arguing that the plurality
engaged in “near total dismissal of the Corps’ and the EPA’s expertise in environmental protection and
hydrology”).
297 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)).
298 Id.
299 Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003)).
294
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the scholarship regarding the interpretive aftermath of Rapanos has made the
same assumption300—an assumption this Article obviously challenges.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment to remand, but little else.
Instead, he authored his own opinion, arguing that the “significant nexus” test
announced in SWANCC still governed CWA navigable waters/waters of the
United States.301 As Justice Kennedy framed the issue, “[The] consolidated
cases require the Court to decide whether the term ‘navigable waters’ in the
Clean Water Act extends to wetlands that do not contain and are not adjacent
to waters that are navigable in fact.”302 Reading Riverside Bayview and
SWANCC together, he concluded:
[I]n some instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, the
connection between a nonnavigable water or wetland and a navigable
water may be so close, or potentially so close, that the Corps may
deem the water or wetland a “navigable water” under the Act. In
other instances, as exemplified by SWANCC, there may be little or no
connection. Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is
303
lacking.

Moreover, SWANCC’s significant-nexus test served to eliminate one category
of waters from CWA jurisdiction—those isolated intrastate waters “that
appeared likely, as a category, to raise constitutional difficulties and federalism
concerns”304—while preserving the federal government’s legitimate concerns
over water quality.
In most other cases, however, jurisdiction over wetlands must be assessed
on a case-by-case basis.305 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy left much potential
room for future regulations. First, he emphasized that “[a]s applied to wetlands
300 See, e.g., Berkolow, supra note 17, at 349 (emphasizing what the courts and legislatures can do in the
wake of Rapanos, not the EPA and the Army Corps); Thigpen, supra note 296, at 90 (“Because the Court
failed to render a majority opinion, the significance of Rapanos on wetland protection is uncertain and will
ultimately be determined by the courts charged with deciphering whether to apply the reasoning set forth by
the plurality or that presented in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.” (emphasis added)); id. at 115 (focusing on
the role of courts in resolving the interpretive problem that Rapanos left); see also Joshua C. Thomas, Note,
Clearing the Muddy Waters? Rapanos and the Post-Rapanos Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Guidance, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 1491, 1528–29 (2008) (arguing that agency regulations would be preferable to agency guidance
and noting that the 2007 Rapanos Guidance “closely tracks the language of the Court’s opinion—as it must”
(emphasis added)).
301 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
302 Id.
303 Id. at 767.
304 Id. at 776.
305 Id. at 782.
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adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps’ conclusive standard for
jurisdiction rests upon a reasonable inference of ecologic interconnection, and
the assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable under the [CWA]
by showing adjacency alone.”306 Second:
Through regulations or adjudication, the Corps may choose to
identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow
(either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters,
or other relevant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands
adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform
important functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable
307
waters.

These “more specific regulations,” Justice Kennedy indicated, would eliminate
the need for a case-by-case significant-nexus analysis.308
Justice Stevens, writing for the four dissenters, would have expanded CWA
jurisdiction to fulfill its purposes of restoring and maintaining the integrity of
the nation’s waters. Moreover, he explicitly would have accorded Chevron
deference to the Army Corps’ (and EPA’s) regulations309 in acknowledged
perpetuation and extension of the Riverside Bayview analysis.310 In fact,
according to the dissenters, the case should have been entirely about Chevron
deference because
concerns about the appropriateness of the Corps’ 30-year
implementation of the Clean Water Act should be addressed to
Congress or the Corps rather than to the Judiciary. Whether the
benefits of particular conservation measures outweigh their costs is a
classic question of public policy that should not be answered by
311
appointed judges.

The dissenters thus would have used a different approach in interpreting
“waters of the United States” than that used by either Justice Scalia or Justice
Kennedy. In light of the splits among the Justices, however, the dissenters
complicated the plurality analysis by announcing that, “[g]iven that all four
Justices who have joined this opinion would uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction in

306

Id. at 780.
Id. at 780–81.
308 Id. at 782.
309 Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
310 Id. at 788, 792 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45
(1984)).
311 Id. at 799.
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both of these cases[,] . . . on remand each of the judgments should be reinstated
if either of those tests is met.”312
Justice Breyer, one of the dissenting Justices, authored the fifth Rapanos
opinion and announced, “In my view, the authority of the Army Corps of
Engineers under the Clean Water Act extends to the limits of congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce.”313 Moreover, he viewed new agency
regulations as imperative, under Chevron-like logic, because “[i]f one thing is
clear, it is that Congress intended the Army Corps of Engineers to make the
complex technical judgments that lie at the heart of the present cases (subject
to deferential judicial review).”314
Thus, the Rapanos Court split with regard to the proper test for figuring out
what waters qualify as waters of the United States and with respect to the
possibility and advisability of new agency regulations in the wake of the
plurality decision. Regarding the deference conundrum and the potential
applicability of Brand X, Rapanos—like Lukhard—offers three irreconcilable
approaches to interpreting the statutory term at issue. Therefore, for all of the
reasons argued in the previous category of this typology, Rapanos cannot be
said to resolve all ambiguity regarding the scope of “waters of the United
States,” leaving room for the EPA and the Army Corps to assert the Brand X
rule and issue a new regulatory interpretation of the CWA. This category of
Supreme Court plurality opinions, like the previous one, thus presents the
involved agencies with the deference conundrum.
Unlike in Lukhard, however, the Rapanos Court was evaluating the validity
of the agencies’ interpretation, embodied in notice-and-comment regulations.
Moreover, five Justices (the plurality and Justice Kennedy) found that
interpretation wanting, at least as applied to certain waters. As a result, and not
forgetting the majority decision in SWANCC, the EPA and the Army Corps
cannot use Brand X to simply reissue their existing regulations interpreting
“waters of the United States.” As was noted in Part I, even the lower federal
courts would resist the application of Brand X in those circumstances.315
Rapanos, despite its multiple opinions, does circumscribe the CWA’s
ambiguity to some not-quite-precise extent beyond the SWANCC majority’s
elimination of isolated waters.
312
313
314
315

Id. at 810.
Id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 811–12.
See discussion supra Part I.C.2.

CRAIG GALLEYSFINAL

56

11/1/2011 12:56 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1

Thus, while under Brand X the EPA and Army Corps retain authority to
reinterpret “waters of the United States,” they cannot simply ignore the
Rapanos opinions. Instead, those opinions should operate as data points
regarding the boundaries of interpretive reasonableness. Or, to put this
category of Supreme Court plurality decisions into Chevron terms, the plurality
decision does not change the answer at Chevron Step One because the statute
remains ambiguous, but it does help to shape the analysis at Chevron Step Two
by limiting the scope of a reasonable agency interpretation.
THE TYPOLOGY OF SUPREME COURT PLURALITY DECISIONS
REGARDING AGENCY-ADMINISTERED STATUTES
CATEGORY

EXAMPLE

Constitutional Validity:
The Court issues a
plurality decision while
ruling on a statute’s
constitutionality.

Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498
(1998)

Statutory
Interpretation for
Nonregulatory
Purposes: The Court
issues a plurality opinion
while interpreting the
statute for some purpose
other than the agency’s
direct implementation,
such as federal
preemption.

Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, 505 U.S. 504
(1992)

AGENCY
RESPONSE
As a practical matter,
the agency must
interpret the Court’s
interpretation to discern
which parts of the
statute, if any, remain
valid, because courts
will not defer to agency
determinations of the
constitutionality of
statutes.
The Court’s decision is
largely irrelevant to the
agency’s regulatory
decisions and hence the
deference conundrum is
unlikely to arise.
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CATEGORY

EXAMPLE

Validity of a
Noninterpretive Rule
or Order: The Court
issues a plurality opinion
regarding the validity of
an agency’s rule or order
on grounds other than
whether the rule or order
properly interprets the
statute—for example,
whether a rule is
arbitrary and capricious
or the agency properly
followed APA
procedures.
Statutory
Interpretation in the
Absence of an Agency
Interpretation: The
Court issues a plurality
opinion regarding the
meaning of an agencymediated statute in the
absence of an existing
agency interpretation.
Validity of the
Agency’s
Interpretation: The
Court issues a plurality
opinion regarding
whether the agency’s
existing interpretation of
the statute is valid.

FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1800 (2009)

Lukhard v. Reed, 481
U.S. 368 (1987)
Borden Ranch
Partnership v. United
States Army Corps of
Engineers, 537 U.S. 99
(2002)

Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006)

AGENCY
RESPONSE
The deference
conundrum does not
arise because the
agency’s interpretation
of the statute is not the
issue. If the agency
wants to validate its
action, it should resolve
the identified
problem(s) if it can.

The agency faces the
deference conundrum,
but Brand X should
govern any formal
interpretation that the
agency issues, because
there is no definitive
Supreme Court
interpretation of the
statute.
The agency faces the
deference conundrum
and indications from at
least some Justices that
there are problems with
the agency’s current
interpretation. Brand X
should still apply
because there is no
definitive interpretation
of the statute, but a wise
agency will also view
the Justices’ opinions as
data points for its new
interpretation.

57

CRAIG GALLEYSFINAL

58

11/1/2011 12:56 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1

IV. A CASE STUDY OF THE DEFERENCE CONUNDRUM: RESPONSES TO RAPANOS
V. UNITED STATES
As noted in Part III, Rapanos v. United States presented the EPA and the
Army Corps with a clear deference conundrum. Moreover, the agencies’
choice regarding what do to in the wake of Rapanos was—and remains—
important because the definition of “waters of the United States” delimits the
scope of federal regulatory authority under the CWA. Continuing dissensus
regarding what qualifies as a water of the United States has created confusion
for the lower courts,316 increased the EPA’s and Army Corps’ regulatory
burden and frustrated their regulatory responsibilities,317 left possibly regulated
entities with unclear and nationally divided rules, and caused a potentially
time-consuming and expensive process for determining whether and how they
will be regulated.318 Indeed, the EPA reported in 2009 that “[i]t has been
difficult for EPA to craft jurisdictional determination guidance that is both
legal [under Rapanos] and usable for field staff.”319 So far, however, like the
lower courts, the agencies have chosen to interpret Rapanos itself rather than
issue new regulations to clarify the meaning of “waters of the United States.”
This Part explores the lower courts’ reactions to Rapanos, then discusses
the EPA’s and the Army Corps’ joint attempt to reconcile the Justices’
opinions through agency guidance. It ends by suggesting that Brand X offers
the agencies, the courts, and the many entities potentially subject to CWA
regulation a clearer and more uniform response to the Supreme Court’s
plurality decision.

316

See discussion infra Part IV.A.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. EPA, REPORT NO. 09-N-0149, CONGRESSIONALLY REQUESTED
REPORT ON COMMENTS RELATED TO EFFECTS OF JURISDICTIONAL UNCERTAINTY ON CLEAN WATER ACT
IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2009) [hereinafter EPA REPORT], available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2009/
20090430-09-N-0149.pdf (emphasizing that jurisdictional determinations are a “major resource drain,” that
“Rapanos has created a lot of uncertainty with regards to EPA’s compliance and enforcement activities,” and
that CWA enforcement has decreased since the decision).
318 See Lawrence R. Liebesman et al., Rapanos v. United States: Searching for a Significant Nexus Using
Proximate Causation and Foreseeability Principles, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,242, 11,253
(2010) (noting that the average applicant for an individual Section 404 permit “spends 788 days and $271,596
in completing the process”).
319 EPA REPORT, supra note 317, at 2.
317
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A. Federal Courts’ Reactions to the Rapanos Decision
In Rapanos itself, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that the Marks rule
would guide lower courts in applying the plurality decision,320 and several
lower courts have followed that suggestion. For example, in two of the earliest
court of appeals cases applying Rapanos, both the Ninth Circuit and the
Seventh Circuit applied Marks to conclude that Justice Kennedy’s significantnexus test provided the narrowest grounds of the decision. The Ninth Circuit’s
analysis was rather short, citing Marks and concluding that “Justice Kennedy,
constituting the fifth vote for reversal, concurred only in the judgment and,
therefore, provides the controlling rule of law.”321 The Seventh Circuit
provided a bit more reasoning, concluding that Justice Kennedy’s “test is
narrower (so far as reining in federal authority is concerned) than the
plurality’s in most cases.”322 Thus, somewhat ironically, these two courts used
Marks to conclude that a test that garnered only one Justice’s vote would be
the exclusive interpretation of CWA “navigable waters.”323 The Eleventh
Circuit later agreed.324
Other lower courts, however, found the Marks rule unhelpful. For example,
in an early unpublished opinion, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Florida attempted to apply the Marks rule to Rapanos, but it concluded that
there was no way to assess whether the plurality’s test or Justice Kennedy’s
test constituted the narrowest grounds for the decision.325 As a result, the
district court adopted Justice Stevens’s suggestion and concluded that CWA
jurisdiction would exist when a water qualified as a water of the United States
under either of the two interpretations.326 The First Circuit soon followed suit,
320 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also Berkolow,
supra note 17, at 319 (noting the Chief Justice’s suggestion that the lower courts apply Marks).
321 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)), withdrawn, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007). But see United States v.
Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 989–91 (9th Cir. 2007) (using all three opinions in Rapanos to conclude that “the
Supreme Court unanimously agreed that intermittent streams (at least those that are seasonal) can be waters of
the United States”).
322 United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing
Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
323 Joseph Cacace has argued cogently that how the Marks rule applies to Rapanos depends on the
approach to Marks that a court takes. Specifically, under either the narrowest-grounds approach or the socialchoice view, Justice Kennedy’s opinion emerges as controlling. Cacace, supra note 25, at 122–23, 125. In
contrast, “The Marks doctrine is essentially inapplicable to Rapanos under the conventional view.” Id. at 124.
324 United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1219–22 (11th Cir. 2007).
325 United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2,
2006) (discussing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
326 Id.

CRAIG GALLEYSFINAL

60

11/1/2011 12:56 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1

noting that Marks “has proven troublesome in application for the Supreme
Court itself and for the lower courts.”327 In particular, applying any narrowestgrounds analysis to Rapanos was unhelpful because “[t]he cases in which
Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction [we]re not a subset of the
cases in which the plurality would limit jurisdiction.”328 As a result, the First
Circuit adopted Justice Stevens’s approach, noting that, in effect, at least five
Justices had voted for both interpretations.329 The Fifth Circuit,330 Sixth
Circuit,331 and Eighth Circuit332 have similarly followed or explicitly adopted
this “either interpretation” approach.333
A very few lower courts essentially elected to ignore Rapanos entirely and
revert to pre-Rapanos circuit precedent on “waters of the United States.” For
example, soon after Rapanos (and before the Fifth Circuit applied all three
major opinions), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
announced that “the Supreme Court failed to reach a consensus of a majority as
to the jurisdictional boundary of the CWA” and that Justice Kennedy
“advanced an ambiguous test—whether a ‘significant nexus’ exists to waters
that are/were/might be navigable. This test leaves no guidance on how to
implement its vague, subjective centerpiece. That is, exactly what is
‘significant’ and how is a ‘nexus’ determined?”334 As a result, “Because
Justice Kennedy failed to elaborate on the ‘significant nexus’ required, this
Court will look to the prior reasoning in this circuit.”335
Thus, there is currently a split in the lower federal courts regarding how to
assess CWA “navigable waters.” Given the acknowledged differences between
the plurality’s approach and Justice Kennedy’s, as a result of the Rapanos
plurality, the CWA is being applied differently in different parts of the

327

United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2006) (referring to Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
Id. at 64.
329 Id. at 64–66.
330 United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 325–27 (5th Cir. 2008).
331 United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 206–10 (6th Cir. 2009) (explicitly ducking what the court
called the “Marks-meets-Rapanos” problem because the water at issue met both the plurality’s and Justice
Kennedy’s tests).
332 United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 798–99 (8th Cir. 2009).
333 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 334–35 (noting that “the majority of courts” that have considered the
issue have followed the either-interpretation approach); id. at 335–38 (noting that the lower courts have taken
one of three approaches in applying Marks to the Rapanos opinions, including the either-interpretation
approach).
334 United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (citation omitted).
335 Id.
328
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country,336 undermining a basic rule-of-law premise that federal law should
apply relatively uniformly across the United States.337 Moreover, lower court
judges’ frustration with the post-Rapanos quagmire is at times palpable.338
Congress, of course, could have resolved the meanings of “navigable
waters” and “waters of the United States” through statutory amendment, but
despite numerous efforts,339 it has not (yet) done so. Perhaps more remarkably,
in over five years of uncertainty, the EPA and the Army Corps have done little
to resolve the confusion that Rapanos left. This inaction continues despite the
importance of the issue to CWA regulation and the relatively clear declarations
by five Rapanos Justices that agency action was possible—even imperative.
B. The 2007 Rapanos Guidance
While the EPA and the Army Corps have not issued new regulations
defining “waters of the United States,” they did, in 2007 (almost a year after
the decision, with an amendment in 2008), issue joint guidance in response to
Rapanos.340 However, the guidance does not reinterpret the CWA; instead, it
attempts to interpret and apply the Rapanos plurality opinions.341 Moreover,
like those federal courts that eschewed the Marks rule in favor of the Justice
Stevens either-interpretation approach, the guidance refuses to choose between
336 See EPA REPORT, supra note 317, at 3 (emphasizing the circuit split and the legal uncertainty that
surrounds CWA jurisdictional determinations, despite the agencies’ guidance).
337 E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 7; Buzbee, supra note 13, at 602.
338 See United States v. Robison, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (detailing, on remand, Senior
District Judge Robert B. Propst’s frustrations with Rapanos and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to define
Justice Kennedy’s significant-nexus test as controlling under Marks, and “direct[ing] the Clerk to reassign this
case to another judge for trial,” at least in part because the judge was “so perplexed by the way the law
applicable to this case has developed that it would be inappropriate for me to try it again”).
339 Jeff B. Kray, Five Years After Rapanos—EPA Prepares New Clean Water Act Jurisdictional
Guidance, MARTEN LAW (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110203-epa-prepares-newcwa-guidance (noting that bills have been introduced in Congress to fix the jurisdictional problem in 2003,
2005, 2007, and 2009). The most recent attempts to define the CWA’s term “waters of the United States” by
statutory amendment are the Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 787, 111th Cong. (2009), and America’s
Commitment to Clean Water Act, H.R. 5088, 111th Cong. (2010).
340 U.S. EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES 1 (2008) [hereinafter
RAPANOS GUIDANCE], available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/CWA_Jurisdiction_Following_
Rapanos120208.pdf. This Article refers to this material as the “Rapanos Guidance.”
341 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 334 (“Significantly, the regulators agree with the majority of courts
considering the issue thus far: the recently released guidance documents essentially provide that the regulators
may assert jurisdiction under the CWA if either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied.”); id. at
346 (“Consequently, the agencies’ approach to guidance for the regulated is a hybrid of the plurality’s and
Justice Kennedy’s tests.”).
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the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s interpretations of “waters of the United
States.”
Specifically, the agencies declared that they would continue to assert
jurisdiction over four categories of waters: “[t]raditional navigable waters” (the
classic source of federal water jurisdiction); “[w]etlands adjacent to traditional
navigable waters” (the Riverside Bayview category); “[n]on-navigable
tributaries of traditional navigable waters that are relatively permanent where
the tributaries typically flow year-round or have continuous flow at least
seasonally” (i.e., tributaries that meet the plurality’s test from Rapanos); and
“[w]etlands that directly abut such tributaries” (i.e., wetlands that meet the
plurality’s test from Rapanos).342
For all other waters, the agencies use Justice Kennedy’s significant-nexus
test.343 More specifically, the agencies use Justice Kennedy’s interpretation to
assess the jurisdictional status of “[n]on-navigable tributaries that are not
relatively permanent,” “[w]etlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that
are not relatively permanent,” and “[w]etlands adjacent to but that do not
directly abut a relatively permanent non-navigable tributary.”344 According to
the guidance, the agencies determine whether a significant nexus exists by
“assess[ing] the flow characteristics and functions of the tributary itself and the
functions performed by all wetlands adjacent to the tributary to determine if
they significantly affect the chemical, physical and biological integrity of
downstream traditional navigable waters.”345 Thus, pursuant to the significantnexus test, the agencies examine both hydrologic (physical) and ecologic
factors.346 Hydrologic factors include “volume, duration, and frequency of
flow, including consideration of certain physical characteristics of the
tributary”; “proximity to the traditional navigable water”; “size of the
watershed”; “average annual rainfall”; and “average annual winter snow
pack.”347 Ecologic factors include “potential of tributaries to carry pollutants
and flood waters to traditional navigable waters,” “provision of aquatic habitat
that supports a traditional navigable water,” “potential of wetlands to trap and
filter pollutants or store flood waters,” and “maintenance of water quality in

342
343
344
345
346
347

RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 340, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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traditional navigable waters.”348 The agencies also emphasize in their Rapanos
Guidance that the significant-nexus test requires documentation of the
evidence of the connections that tributaries and wetlands have to traditional
navigable waters.349
For now, therefore, the Army Corps and EPA have declined to exercise the
interpretive authority that the CWA delegated to them in responding to
Rapanos. Moreover, the agencies appear to believe that this is their only
option. In May 2011, they released a proposed second round of post-Rapanos
guidance,350 which again operates to reconcile the various Rapanos
opinions.351 The proposed new guidance does better in explaining some aspects
of how the agencies will apply Rapanos, providing:
• Clarification that small streams and streams that flow part of the
year are protected under the Clean Water Act if they have a
physical, chemical or biological connection to larger bodies of water
downstream and could affect the integrity of those downstream
waters. Agencies would be able to evaluate groups of waters
holistically rather than the current, piecemeal, stream-by-stream
analysis.
• Acknowledgment that when a water body does not have a surface
connection to an interstate water or a traditional navigable water,
but there is a significant physical, chemical or biological connection
between the two, both waterbodies should be protected under the
Clean Water Act.
• Recognition that waterbodies may be “traditional navigable waters,”
and subject to Clean Water Act protections, under a wider range of
circumstances than identified in previous guidance.
• Clarification that interstate waters (crossing state borders) are
352
protected.

Nevertheless, the agencies still very much consider themselves bound to
reconciling the Rapanos plurality opinions. For example, they have declared

348

Id.
Id. at 11.
350 EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Guidance Regarding Identification of Waters Protected by the
Clean Water Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,479 (May 2, 2011); see also U.S. EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS,
DRAFT GUIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS PROTECTED BY THE CLEAN WATER ACT 1 (2011) [hereinafter
DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/wous_guidance_42011.pdf.
351 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 350, at 1–3.
352 Guidance to Identify Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, http://water.epa.gov/
lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/CWAwaters_guidesum.cfm (last updated Apr. 27, 2011).
349
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that “[t]he proposed guidance is consistent with the principles established by
the Supreme Court cases and is supported by the agencies’ scientific
understanding of how waterbodies and watersheds function.”353 The comment
period for the proposed guidance remained open into July 2011, with final
issuance expected thereafter.354
C. The Rapanos Guidance in the Federal Courts
In issuing the 2007 Rapanos Guidance, the EPA and the Army Corps
elected to act as agencies interpreting the Supreme Court, rather than agencies
interpreting the CWA. Under this Article’s argument, therefore, the agencies
have thus far foregone any claims to Chevron deference for their interpretation
of “waters of the United States.”355
Nevertheless, the Rapanos Guidance has received little discussion from the
lower federal courts. What opinions do exist emphasize its tentative356 and
nonbinding nature,357 underscoring the fact that Chevron deference is
inappropriate regardless of Brand X.
So far, only one federal court, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, has wrestled with the issue of deference to the Army
Corps’ determinations of CWA jurisdiction under the Rapanos Guidance, and
its opinion demonstrates the tangled deference issues that courts now face in
the context of CWA jurisdictional determinations. In Precon Development
Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Eastern District of
Virginia faced a challenge to the Army Corps’ determination that CWA
jurisdiction existed over a particular body of water after the Army Corps used

353 EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Guidance Regarding Identification of Waters Protected by the
Clean Water Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,479.
354 Id.
355 Of course, the form of the guidance would also cause problems with Chevron deference because the
agencies did not issue it through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The point here, however, is that the
agencies have chosen to try to interpret the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Rapanos rather than assert
their own authority to interpret the CWA itself.
356 P & V Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that, in
light of the Rapanos Guidance, “[a]ny evaluation of the Corps’ CWA jurisdiction thus appears far from
complete”).
357 See Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Precon I), 658 F. Supp. 2d 752, 764 (E.D. Va.
2009) (noting that the Army Corps is not bound by the guidance in making jurisdictional determinations);
United States v. Moses, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1226 (D. Idaho 2009) (emphasizing, in response to a claim that
the Army Corps had deviated from the guidance, that “the guidance memorandum is just that—a guidance
memorandum”).
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the Rapanos Guidance to determine that jurisdiction existed.358 The court spent
two pages of the opinion discussing the appropriate deference and the potential
applicability of the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the APA’s
substantial-evidence standard, and the Chevron framework.359 It concluded that
Chevron provided the correct framework for evaluating the deference owed to
the agencies but that, after SWANCC and Rapanos, the Army Corps was not
entitled to Chevron deference based on its unamended “waters of the United
States” regulations.360 Moreover, because the Rapanos Guidance was not
issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and because the Army Corps
did not make its jurisdictional determination through formal adjudication,
neither the guidance nor the jurisdictional determination was entitled to
Chevron deference.361 Indeed, the United States conceded that the guidance
was not entitled to Chevron deference.362 As a result, the Army Corps’
determination through the guidance would be judged pursuant to Skidmore
deference.363 In its January 2011 decision on appeal, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed that Skidmore deference was appropriate.364
Although the district court did uphold the jurisdictional determination
under Skidmore,365 its struggles with the deference issue signal that Rapanos’s
legacy of legal uncertainty is not limited to the question of what interpretation
to use to determine whether a body of water qualifies as a CWA navigable
water. In addition, the EPA’s and Army Corps’ partially invalidated and
partially upheld notice-and-comment regulations currently coexist with the
Rapanos plurality opinions, the lower court splits, and the informally issued
Rapanos Guidance, creating a jumble of deference issues and adding to the
confusion for lower courts already coping with the Rapanos plurality decision.

358

Precon I, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 756.
Id. at 759–61.
360 Id. at 761–62.
361 Id.
362 Id. at 763.
363 Id.
364 Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Precon II), 633 F.3d 278, 290 n.10 (4th Cir. 2011)
(confirming that the Army Corps could not receive Chevron deference); id. at 291 (confirming that the Army
Corps was entitled to Skidmore deference).
365 Precon I, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 765. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the Army Corps’
administrative record regarding the presence of a significant nexus under the Rapanos Guidance to be
insufficient. Precon II, 633 F.3d at 297.
359
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D. Resolving the Conundrum: A Better Response to Rapanos
As of mid-2011, therefore, none of the normative goals of a federal
regulatory scheme (or the rule of law more generally) are actually being met.
The CWA’s term “waters of the United States” is subject to different legal tests
in different circuits, destroying the goal of national uniformity. Regulated
entities are subject to differing and unclear rules for when the CWA applies.
This reality undermines norms of evenhanded regulation, consistency of the
law, and comprehensible notice of legal obligations. Resolution of
jurisdictional issues, especially pursuant to the case-by-case significant-nexus
analysis,366 is complex, time-consuming, and expensive for both the regulating
agencies and the regulated entities, defeating goals of regulatory efficiency.
In the continued absence of congressional action, Brand X offers the EPA
and the Army Corps a way to resolve the post-Rapanos definitional confusion
regarding the CWA’s “navigable waters.” Brand X also offers a way to restore
the national uniformity that is supposed to be the hallmark of federal law. As
was discussed in Part III, the two agencies are not locked in a trap of
interpreting the Rapanos Court; instead, as agencies, they can issue new
notice-and-comment regulations and demand Chevron deference for their
interpretations.
Of course, as lower courts have pointed out in other Brand X contexts,367
the two CWA agencies could not legitimately repromulgate their existing
regulations because the Supreme Court’s decisions in Riverside Bayview,
SWANCC, and even Rapanos provide relevant legal data points regarding the
scope of a reasonable interpretation of “waters of the United States.” For
example, under all three decisions, navigable-in-fact waters are clearly subject
to the CWA. Under Riverside Bayview, wetlands adjacent to these larger
waters, and probably the immediate tributaries of those waters, are waters of
the United States. In contrast, under SWANCC’s semi-constitutional analysis,
“waters of the United States” cannot include small and isolated waters with no
hydrologic connection to other waters. SWANCC and Rapanos also both
underscore a concern with federalism issues and the Commerce Clause

366

See EPA REPORT, supra note 317, at 1–3 (detailing the agency’s difficulties after Rapanos); Kenneth
S. Gould, Drowning in Wetlands Jurisdictional Determination Process: Implementation of Rapanos v. United
States, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 413, 440–49 (2008) (detailing at length how difficult obtaining a
permit has become under the significant-nexus test); Liebesman et al., supra note 318, at 11,253 (“The
significant nexus concept is fraught with unknowns.”).
367 See supra Part I.C.2.
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limitations of federal regulatory authority, and all three cases indicate that the
agencies’ definition of “waters of the United States” should relate to the
CWA’s core purpose—“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”368
Nevertheless, while these legal data points identify interpretive constraints
(especially constraints touching on the U.S. Constitution), they do not
eliminate all (or even much) agency flexibility in defining “waters of the
United States.” In particular, the agencies should be free to reject both the
plurality’s test and Justice Kennedy’s case-by-case significant-nexus
approach—which both the agencies and commentators view as pragmatically
unmanageable369—in favor of a definition of “waters of the United States” that
is both broader than the plurality’s interpretation and easier to apply than
Justice Kennedy’s interpretation. For example, the agencies could use their
expertise to establish definitive categories of waters of the United States, with
perhaps brighter-line tests based on size, flow, proximity to navigable waters,
expected effects on downstream navigable waters and on commerce, and so
forth. Such categories would both provide clearer criteria for regulated entities
to apply than the significant-nexus analysis and improve regulatory efficiency
on all sides.
If the courts are faithful to Brand X, these new and clearer regulations
should become the nationally controlling law pursuant to Chevron. Such
uniform, nationally applicable regulations would dramatically improve the
post-Rapanos disarray by (1) improving the agencies’ own enforcement
efficiency and evenhandedness; (2) reestablishing the equality of potentially
regulated entities throughout the nation with respect to the CWA’s
applicability; (3) clarifying when regulated entities are subject to the CWA’s
permitting requirements; and (4) clarifying and simplifying judicial review of
challenged assertions of CWA jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
At the formation of the United States, Alexander Hamilton argued that the
definitive motive for establishing a single national Supreme Court was the
“necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws.”370 When the
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Supreme Court abdicates its responsibility to provide this national uniformity
and clarity, as it does in plurality decisions, the legal issue at stake may in
many cases simply have to re-percolate through the lower federal courts before
the confusion and lower court splits are finally resolved.
However, when the Supreme Court issues plurality decisions regarding
agency-administered statutes or administrative interpretations, Congress has
provided another entity that can reestablish the expected norms of uniformity
and clarity in the application of federal law. Indeed, an argument can be made
that federal agencies, even more than the Supreme Court, have positive and
normative duties to resolve the dissensus that a plurality decision embodies. As
Elizabeth Foote aptly recognized, the core function of a federal agency is
public administration of a federal program,371 at a national level:
Unlike courts, . . . agencies do not exist to issue disinterested and
authoritative interpretations of statutes based on strictly legal
processes. As organizations of public administration, agencies are
charged with carrying out statutory provisions—that is, with
implementing public policies through operational programs.
Administrative rules represent interstitial, provisional, operational
applications that can be, and often are, altered as agency expertise
evolves and political currents shift. Accordingly, agencies by law use
institutional processes that involve controls by the political branches.
They have mechanisms for public input and accountability that
advance bureaucratic and management objectives and rely on
technical expertise. While statutory factors are part of the
administrative process, the business of public bureaucracies is not the
same as the business of the courts to interpret statutes in cases or
372
controversies.

In Brand X, the Supreme Court established that federal agencies can
displace federal court interpretations of the statutes that federal agencies
implement. Whatever arguments exist for sequestering Supreme Court
majority decisions from the operation of Brand X, they cannot operate to
immobilize federal agencies coping with Supreme Court plurality decisions.
Instead, Brand X frees a federal agency to continue to exercise its own
interpretive authority, promoting national uniformity and the rule of law in a
post-plurality regulatory world.
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